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This problem of getting the interpretation proved to be rather more
difficult than just working out the equation.
P.A.M. Dirac
Ask not if quantum mechanics is true, ask rather what the theory implies. What
does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows then, when quantum
theory is applied without restriction, if need be to the whole universe?
This is the question this book addresses. The answers vary widely. Ac-
cording to one view, ‘what follows’ is a detailed and realistic picture of reality
that provides a unified description of micro- and macroworlds. But according
to another, the result is nonsense – there is no physically meaningful theory at
all, or not in the sense of a realist theory, a theory supposed to give an intel-
ligible picture of a reality existing independently of our thoughts and beliefs.
According to the latter view, the formalism of quantum mechanics, if applied
unrestrictedly, is at best a fragment of such a theory, in need of substantive
additional assumptions and equations.
So sharp a division about what appears to be a reasonably well-defined
question is all the more striking given how much agreement there is otherwise.
For all parties to the debate in this book are agreed on realism, and on the
need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds. They
all see it as legitimate – obligatory even – to ask whether the fundamental
equations of quantum mechanics, principally the Schro¨dinger equation, already
constitute such a system. They all agree that such equations, if they are to be
truly fundamental, must ultimately apply to the entire universe. And most of
the authors also agree that the quantum state should be treated as something
physically real. But now disagreements set in.
For the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schro¨dinger
equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something
physically real, but with no additional, special hypotheses, then without making
any additional hypotheses, there follows a conservative picture of the small
macroscopic, consistent with standard applications of quantum mechanics to
the special sciences, a picture that extends to the biological sciences, to people,
planets, galaxies, and ultimately the entire universe, but only insofar as this
universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of
which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett
interpretation of quantum mechanics.
But contrary claims say this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent
in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and
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even given that the quantum state is physically real. And if such a picture
were implied by the Schro¨dinger equation, that would only go to show that
this equation must be restricted or supplemented or changed. For (run contrary
claims) this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense. The stuff of
these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained, nor are the
worlds precisely defined; ordinary ideas about time and identity over time are
compromised; the concept of probability is in question. This picture of many
branching worlds is inchoate. There are realist alternatives to many worlds
theory, among them theories that leave the Schro¨dinger equation unchanged.
These are the claims and counterclaims argued in this book. This introduction
is in three parts. The first is partisan, making the case for many worlds in the
light of recent discoveries; the crucial new datum, absent from earlier discus-
sions, is decoherence theory, which in this book takes centre stage. Section 2 is
even-handed, and sketches the main arguments of the book: on ontology, the
existence of worlds; on probability, as reduced to the branching structure of the
quantum state; and on alternatives to many worlds, realist proposals that leave
the Schro¨dinger equation unchanged. The third and final section summarizes
some of the mathematical ideas, including the consistent histories formalism.
1 The case for many worlds
1.1 Realism and quantum mechanics
As Popper once said, physics has always been in crisis, yet there was a special
kind of crisis that set in with quantum mechanics. For despite all its obvious
empirical success and fecundity, the theory was based on rules or prescriptions
that seemed inherently contradictory. There never was any real agreement on
these matters among the founding fathers of the theory. Bohr and later Heisen-
berg in their more philosophical writings provided little more than a fig-leaf;
the emperor, to the eyes of realists, wore no clothes. Text book accounts of
quantum mechanics in the last half-century have by and large been operational-
ist. They say as little as possible about Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s philosophy or
about realism.
In what sense are the rules of quantum mechanics contradictory? They break
down into two parts. One is the unitary formalism, notably the Schro¨dinger
equation, governing the evolution of the quantum state. It is deterministic
and encodes space-time and dynamical symmetries. Whether for a particle
system or a system of fields, the Schro¨dinger equation is linear: the sum of two
solutions to the equation is also a solution (the superposition principle). This
gives the solution space of the Schro¨dinger equation the structure of a vector
space (Hilbert space).
However there are also rules for another kind of dynamical evolution for the
state, which is – well, none of the above. These rules govern the collapse of the
wave-function. They are indeterministic and non-linear, respecting none of the
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space-time or dynamical symmetries. And unlike the unitary evolution, there
is no obvious route to investigating the collapse process empirically.
Understanding state collapse, and its relationship to the unitary formalism,
is the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. There are other conceptual
questions in physics, but few if any of them are genuinely paradoxical. None,
for their depth, breadth and longevity, can hold a candle to the measurement
problem.
Why not say the collapse is simply irreducible, ‘the quantum jump’, some-
thing primitive, inevitable in a theory which is fundamentally a theory of chance?
Because it isn’t only the collapse process itself that is under-specified: the time
of the collapse, within relatively wide limits, is undefined, and the criteria for
the kind of collapse, linking the set of possible outcomes of the experiment to
the wave-function, are strange. They either refer to another theory entirely –
classical mechanics – or worse, they refer to our ‘intentions’, to the ‘purpose’ of
the experiment. They are the measurement postulates (‘probability postulates’
would be better, as this is the only place probabilities enter into quantum me-
chanics). One is the Born rule, assigning probabilities (as determined by the
quantum state) to macroscopic outcomes; the other is the projection postulate,
assigning a new microscopic state to the system measured, depending on the
macroscopic outcome. True, the latter is only needed when the measurement
apparatus is functioning as a state-preparation device, but there is no doubt
that something happens to the microscopic system on triggering a macroscopic
outcome.
Whether or not the projection postulate is needed in a particular experiment,
the Born rule is essential. It provides the link between the possible macroscopic
outcomes and the antecedent state of the microscopic system. As such it is usu-
ally specified by giving a choice of vector basis – a set of orthogonal unit vectors
in the state space — whereupon the state is written as a superposition of these.
The modulus square of the amplitude of each term in the superposition thus
defined is the probability of the associated macroscopic outcome (see Section
3). But what dictates the choice of basis? What determines the time at which
this outcome happens? How does the measurement apparatus interact with the
microscopic system to produce these effects?
From the point of view of the realist the answer seems obvious. The ap-
paratus itself should be modelled in quantum mechanics; then its interaction
with the microscopic system can be studied dynamically. But if this description
is entirely quantum mechanical, if the dynamics is unitary, it is deterministic.
Probabilities only enter the conventional theory explicitly with the measurement
postulates. The straightforwardly physicalistic strategy seems bound to fail.
How are realists to make sense of this? The various solutions that have been
proposed down the years runs into scores, but they fall into two broadly recogniz-
able classes. One concludes that the wave function describes not the microscopic
system itself, but our knowledge of it, or the information we have available of
it (perhaps ‘ideal’ or ‘maximal’ knowledge or information). No wonder mod-
elling the apparatus in the wave-function is no solution: that only shifts the
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problem further back, ultimately to ‘the observer’ and to questions about the
mind, or consciousness, or information – all ultimately philosophical questions.
Anti-realists welcome this conclusion; according to them, we neglect our special
status as ‘observers’ at our peril. But from a realist point of view this just leaves
open the question of what the goings-on at the microscopic level, thus revealed,
actually are. By all means constrain the spatiotemporal description (by the
uncertainty relations or information-theoretic analogues), still some spatiotem-
poral description must be found, down to the lengthscales of cells and complex
molecules at least, even if not all the way to atomic processes. That leads to the
demand for equations for variables that do not involve the wave-function, or, if
none is to be had in quantum mechanics, for something entirely new, glimpsed
hitherto only with regard to statistics: for a better theory. This was essentially
Einstein’s settled view.
The only other serious alternative (to realists) is quantum state realism, the
view that the quantum state is physically real, changing in time according to
the unitary equations and, somehow, also in accordance with the measurement
postulates.
How so? Here differences in views set in. Some advocate that the Schro¨dinger
equation itself must be changed (so as to give, in the right circumstances, col-
lapse as a fundamental process). They are for a collapse theory.
Others argue that the Schro¨dinger equation can be left alone if only it is
supplemented by additional equations, governing ‘hidden’ variables. These, de-
spite their name, constitute the real ontology, the stuff of tables and chairs and
so forth, but their behaviour is governed by the wave function. This is the pilot-
wave theory. Collapse in a theory like this is only ‘effective’, as reflecting the
sudden irrelevance (in the right circumstances) of some part of the wave-function
in its influence on these variables. And once irrelevant in this way, always irrel-
evant: such parts of the wave-function can simply be discarded. This explains
the appearance of collapse.
But for others again, no such additional variables are needed. The collapse
is indeed only ‘effective’, but that reflects, not a change in the influence of one
part of the quantum state on some hidden or ‘real’ ontology, but rather the
change in dynamical influence of one part of the wave-function over another –
the ‘decoherence’ of one part from the other. The result is a branching structure
to the wave function, and again, collapse only in a phenomenological, effective
sense. But then, if our world is just one of these branches, all these branches
must be worlds. Thus the many-worlds theory.
This concept of decoherence played only a shadowy role in the first 50 years
of quantum mechanics, but in the last three decades it has been developed
more systematically. As applied to the wave function to derive a structure of
branching worlds it is more recent still. It changes the nature of the argument
about the existence of worlds. The claim is that the worlds are dynamically
robust patterns in the wave function, obeying approximately classical equations.
They are genuine discoveries, the outcome of theoretical investigations into the
unitary formalism, not from posits or hypotheses. And if this is so: it puts
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collapse theories and pilot-wave theories in a different light. It would show
them as modifying or supplementing quantum mechanics not in the name of
realism, and still less because of any conflict with experiment, but because the
world as depicted by quantum mechanics is in conflict with a priori standards
of acceptability – at the fundamental level, as too strange, at the emergent level
of worlds, as insufficiently precise or as ontologically profligate.
But if decoherence theory makes a difference to our understanding of the
quantum state, as applied to sufficiently complex many particle systems, it is
not so clear that it touches that other ground on which the Everett interpretation
has been rejected – that if quantum mechanics is a purely deterministic theory
of many worlds, the idea of objective probability is simply no longer applicable.
Failing a solution to this, the ‘incoherence problem’, the Everett interpretation
does not provide an empirical theory at all. And with that the argument against
modifying quantum mechanics on realist grounds completely collapses.
We shall see how this argument played out in the first three decades of the
Everett interpretation in a moment. In fact it is just here, on the interpre-
tation of probability, that inattention to the concept of decoherence was most
damaging. And looking ahead: there is a further important sense in which the
argument over many worlds has been changed. In recent years, with the de-
velopment of decision-theory methods for quantifying subjective probability in
quantum mechanics, the link between probability in the subjective sense and
an objective counterpart has been greatly clarified. Specifically, if can be shown
that agents who are rational, in order to achieve their ends, have no option but
to use the the modulus squared branch amplitudes in weighting their utilities.
In this sense the Born rule has been derived.
That goes with other arguments about probability. From a philosophical
point of view this link with rational belief, or credence, has always been the
most important – and baﬄing – of the roles played by objective probability. If
it is shown to be played by these branching structures, then they are objec-
tive probabilities. Meanwhile other puzzles specific to the picture of branching
worlds (particularly to do with personal identity) can be solved or sidelined.
These claims need to be argued one by one. The first step is to get a clearer
understanding of the early debates about many worlds, in the first quarter-
century since their appearance.
1.2 Early history
The many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics was first proposed by H.
Everett III in his doctoral (‘long’) dissertation, written under his supervisor J.
A. Wheeler. It was cut down to a quarter of its size on Wheeler’s insistence, but
in this form it won a Ph.D. It won him a ringing endorsement by Wheeler too,
when it was published shortly thereafter, as ‘“Relative State” Formulation of
Quantum Mechanics’ (Everett [1957], Wheeler [1957]).1 The main mathematical
ideas of this paper are explained in Section 3.
1This story is told by Peter Byrne in Chapter 17.
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Ten years later it was endorsed again, but this time with rather greater
fidelity to Everett’s ideas, by B. DeWitt [1967, 1970] (introducing the terminol-
ogy ‘many worlds’ and ‘many universes’ for the first time in print). DeWitt,
in collaboration with his Ph.D student N. Graham, also published Everett’s
long dissertation, as ‘The Theory of the Universal Wave Function’. This and a
handful of much smaller articles made up their compilation The Many Worlds
Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (DeWitt and Graham [1973]).
But as such it had a notable deficiency. It lacked an account of why the
wave function must be viewed in terms of one sort of multiplicity rather than
another – and why, even, a multiplicity at all. What reason there was to view
the quantum state in this way (as a superposition of possible outcomes) came
from the measurement postulates – the very postulates that Everett, by his own
admission, was intent on doing away with.
This is the ‘preferred basis problem’ of the Everett interpretation (Ballen-
tine [1973]). If the basis is determined by the ‘purpose’ of the experiment,
then the measurement postulates are blatantly still in play. DeWitt, who was
more interested in applying quantum mechanics to gravitating systems (hence,
ultimately, to the entire universe) than in getting rid of any special mention
of experiments in the definition of the theory, went so far as to postulate the
existence of apparatuses as an axiom.
But Everett was able to derive at least a fragment of the Born rule. Given
that the measure over the space of branches is a function of the branch ampli-
tudes, the question arises: What function? If the measure is to be additive, so
that the measure of a sum of branches is the sum of their measures, it follows it
is the modulus square – that was something. The set of branches, complete with
additive measure, then constitute a probability space. As such versions of the
Bernouilli and other large number theorems can be derived. They imply that
the measure of all the branches exhibiting anomalous statistics (with respect to
this measure) is small when the number of trials is sufficiently large, and goes
to zero in the limit – that was something more.
It was enough to raise the prospect of a frequentist account of quantum
probability – meaning, an account that identifies probabilities with actual rel-
ative frequencies – and to raise the hope, more generally, that the probability
interpretation of quantum mechanics was itself derivable from the unitary for-
malism. DeWitt was further impressed by a result due to his Ph.D. student N.
Graham [1970] (and discovered independently by J. B. Hartle [1968]): for the
kth possible outcome of an experiment, it is possible to construct a ‘relative-
frequency operator’, of which the grand superposition of all possible outcomes
on N repetitions of the experiment is an eigenstate in the limit as N →∞. The
corresponding eigenvalue, he showed, equals the Born rule probability for the
kth outcome in a single trial.
Another way of putting it (DeWitt 1970 p.162-63) was that the components
of the total superposition representing ‘maverick’ worlds (recording anomalous
statistics at variance with the Born rule) are of measure zero, in the Hilbert
space norm, in the limit N → ∞. But whilst formal criteria like these may
be required of an acceptable theory of probability, they are hardly sufficient
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in themselves. They do not explain probability in terms of existing states of
affairs, which invariably involve only finitely many trials. To suppose that states
whose records of outcomes are large are ‘close to’ states in the infinite limit, and
therefore record the right relative frequencies (or that those that do are more
probable than those that do not), is to beg the question2.
These are defects of frequentism as a theory of probability; they are hardly
specific to the Everett interpretation. But in one respect frequentism in the
context of many worlds seems to fare worse. For assuming (as Everett’s original
notation suggested) that branches are in one-one correspondence with sequences
of experimental outcomes, the set of all worlds recording the results of N trials
can be represented by the set of all possible sequences of length N . In that case
there is an obvious rival to the Born rule: this set of sequences has a natural
statistical structure independent of the amplitude, anyway invisible, attached
to each world. A priori, there are many more of them for which the relative
frequency of the kth outcome is close to one half, than of those in which it is
closer to zero or one.
This is to treat each distinct sequence as equiprobable. Predictions using
this rule would have been wildly contradicted by the empirical evidence, true,
but that only goes to show that the probability rule in the Everett interpretation
is not forced by the equations – that the Born rule, far from being an obvious
consequence of the interpretation of the quantum state in terms of many worlds,
appears quite unreasonable.
Attempts to patch up this problem only made clearer its extent. The diffi-
culty – call it the ‘combinatorics problem’ – was first pointed out by Graham
[1973]: he suggested that experiments must involve as an intermediary a ther-
modynamic system of large numbers of degrees of freedom, for which the count
of states did reflect the Born rule quantities. But few found this argument per-
suasive. And the problem highlighted the deficiencies of Everett’s derivation of
the Born rule: for why assume the probability measure on the space of branches
is a function only of the branch amplitudes? This assumption, given the picture
of many worlds, now seemed ad hoc.
Failing a solution to the preferred basis problem, the theory was not even
well-defined; if the problem is solved by evoking a special status to experiments,
the theory was not even a form of realism; however it is solved, the very picture
of many worlds suggests a probability measure at odds with the statistical evi-
dence. It is hardly surprising that the Everett interpretation was ignored by J.
S. Bell, when he posed his famous dilemma:
Either the wave function, as given by the Schro¨dinger equation, is
not everything, or it is not right. (Bell [1987 p.201])
But the situation looks quite different today.
2Ochs [1977] and Farhi et al [1989] offered improvements on the rigour of the argument,
but not on its physical significance.
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1.3 Ontology and decoherence
Decoherence theory has its roots in Ehrenfest’s theorem3 and the very early de-
bates about foundations in quantum mechanics, but its development was slow.
It remains to this day more of a heterogenous collection of techniques than a sys-
tematic theory. But these techniques concern a common question: under what
circumstances and with respect to what basis and dynamical variables does a
superposition of states behave dynamically just as if it were an incoherent mix-
ture of those same states? This question already arises in conventional quantum
mechanics using the measurement postulates (the choice of the von Neumann
‘cut’): at what point in the unitary evolution can the latter be applied?. If too
early, interference effects of salience to the actual behaviour of the apparatus
will be destroyed.
The 1980s saw a plethora of toy models attempting to answer this question.
Many relied on the system–environment distinction and the Schmidt decompo-
sition (see Section 3.3). Together, apart from exceptional cases, they defined
a unique basis, with respect to which at any time mixtures and superpositions
of states were exactly equivalent, under the measurement postulates, for ob-
servables restricted to the system alone or to the environment alone. But not
for other observables; and the basis that resulted was in some cases far from
well-localized, and sensitive to the details of the dynamics and the system-
environment distinction.
In contrast, states well-localized in phase space – wave-packets – reliably de-
cohere, and even though elements of a superposition, evolve autonomously from
each other for a wide class of Hamiltonians. With respect to states like these
Ehrenfest’s theorem takes on a greatly strengthened form. But decoherence in
this sense is invariably approximate; it is never an all-or-nothing thing.
Very little of this literature made mention of the Everett interpretation: it
was hoped that decoherence would solve the measurement problem in a one-
world setting. And where Everett’s ideas were involved, it was the concept of
‘relative state’ , as formulated (in terms of the decoherence of the environment)
by W.H. Zurek ([1982]). According to Zurek, such states need not coexist;
rather, macroscopic quantities were subject to ‘environmental superselection’,
after the idea of superselection rules, latterly introduced, prohibiting the de-
velopment of superpositions of states corresponding to different super-selected
quantities like charge. But if so, surely decoherence, like superselection, has to
be exact, returning us to the Schmidt decomposition.4
The exception was H. D. Zeh’s ‘On the interpretation of measurement in
quantum mechanics’ ([1970]), which engaged with Everett’s proposal more com-
prehensively. In it Zeh set out the idea of dynamical decoherence as a stability
3This theorem is explained and improved on by Jim Hartle in Chapter 2.
4The attempt to define the preferred basis in terms of the Schmidt decomposition was
taken to its logical conclusion in the ‘modal’ interpretation, as developed in the mid ’90s by
D. Dieks, G. Bacciagaluppi, and P. Vermas, among others. But this ran into an embarrassment
of technical difficulties (see, in particular, Bacciagaluppi [2000]). The extension to the N-body
case was restrictive, the basis thus selected was defective, particularly in the case of quantum
fields, and no non-trivial Lorentz covariant theory of this kind could be found.
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condition. He gave the example of sugar molecules of definite chirality; in a
superposition of left- and right-handed molecules, each term evolves by a dy-
namical process which, however complicated, is almost completely decoupled
from motion of the other. Dynamical stability, he proposed, was the key to
de fining the preferred basis problem in the Everett interpretation.
But Zeh’s argument was qualitative, and in subsequent publications (Zeh
[1973], Ku¨bler and Zeh [1973]), which did give detailed calculations, he used
the Schmidt decomposition instead. This still chimed with Everett’s idea of
the ‘relative state’ (see Section 3.2), but the idea of dynamical stability was
marginalized. And an inessential one was added: Zeh spoke of the need for a
‘localization of consciousness’ not only in space and time but also in ‘certain
Hilbert-space components’ [1970 p.74], an idea he attributed to Everett.5 That
fostered the view that some high-level hypothesis about mentality was needed if
the Everett interpretation was to go through. But if the Everett interpretation
recovers the elements of quantum chemistry, solid state physics and hydrody-
namics, as the effective theories governing each branch, questions of mentality
can be left to the biological sciences. They need no more intrude in the Everett
interpretation than they do in a hidden-variable or collapse theory.
Add to this mix the consistent histories formalism of W. Griffiths [1984] and
R. Omne`s [1988], and especially as developed by M. Gell-Mann and J. B. Hartle
[1990, 1993]. In this approach a division between subsystem and environment is
inessential: the key idea is the coarse-graining of certain dynamical variables and
the definition of quantum histories as time-ordered sequences of coarse-grained
values of these variables (Section 3.3). The wave-function of the universe – in
the Heisenberg picture – is in effect the superposition of these histories. The
choice of variables – of the history space – is equivalent to the choice of preferred
basis.
But this is to put the matter in Everettian terms. The consistent histories
theory was based rather on a certain formal constraint, required if a space of
quantum histories is to have the structure of a probability space: the ‘consis-
tency condition’ (Section 3.4). Meanwhile the quantum state, in the Heisenberg
picture, could be viewed as no more than a probability measure on this space,
of which only one history, it seemed, need be real.6
The goal was once again a one-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.
But for that, fairly obviously, the history space had to be fixed once and for all.
It was clear from the beginning that there were many consistent history spaces
for a fixed initial state and Hamiltonian – which one should we choose? But it
was thought that at least the actual history of the world and its history space
up to some time, once given, dictated the probabilities for subsequent events
5Taken up by M. Lockwood in his Mind, Brain and Quantum ([1989]) and by J. Barrett
in The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds ([1999]) (for commentaries, see my [1996a,
2001]). Everett made no metion of consciousness, although he did speak of ‘experience’. Zeh
has continued to insist on the need, in the Everett interpretation, for a special postulate
concerning consciousness (Zeh [2000]).
6This turns the wave-function of the universe into something more like a law than a physi-
cally existing thing. See Antony Valentini in Chapter 16 for criticism of an analogous proposal
in the context of pilot-wave theory.
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unequivocally. Far from it: as F. Dowker and A. P. A. Kent shortly showed,
a history space up to some time can be deformed into any one of a continuous
infinity of other history spaces for subsequent times, preserving the consistency
condition exactly (Dowker and Kent [1996]).
But this difficulty does not apply to the marriage of decoherence theory
in the more general sense with the consistent histories formalism, as carried
through by Gell-Mann and Hartle and J. J. Halliwell in the 1990s and 2000’s.7
Decohering histories in the latter sense are robustly defined. But decoherence
(and the consistency condition) obtained in this way is never exact. On a
one-world interpretation, ‘sufficiently small’ interference  is the criterion for
probabilistic change at the fundamental level; what value of  > 0, precisely,
is the trigger? Worse, there is no algorithm for extracting even approximately
decohering histories for any Hamiltonian and any state. How are the latter to
be constrained? This is at best a programme for modifying quantum mechanics,
or replacing it.
It is otherwise if decoherent histories theory is in service of the Everett
interpretation – defining, among other things, the preferred basis. In that case
it hardly matters if for some states and regimes decohering histories are simply
absent altogether: the fundamental reality, the wave-function of the universe,
is still well-defined (Zurek [1993], Saunders [1993, 1995a]). Context-dependence
and inexactitude as to how it is to be broken down into recognizable parts is to
be expected.
It is a further and quite distinct question as to what kinds of parts or worlds,
governed by what kinds of equations, are thus identified. The ones so far dis-
covered are all approximately classical – classical, but with dissipation terms
present that reflect their quantum origins8. In the terminology of Gell-Mann
and Hartle [1990], such a set of decoherent histories is a ‘quasiclassical domain’
(in their more recent writings, ‘realm’). Might there be non-classical realms,
other preferred bases, involving sets of equations for completely alien variables?
Perhaps. But that need not pose any difficulty for the Everett interpretation.
There is no reason to think the kind of under-determination of consistent history
space by past history, discovered by Dowker and Kent, applies to realms.
And now for the killer observation (Wallace [2003a]): this business of ex-
tracting approximate, effective equations, along with the structures or patterns
that they govern, is routine in the physical sciences. Such patterns may be high-
level, ‘emergent’ ontology; they are fluids, or crystals, or complex hydrocarbon
molecules, ascending to cells, living organisms, planets, and galaxies. Equally
7Chapter 2, by Jim Hartle, is a general review; Chapter 3, by Jonathan Halliwell, is a
detailed study of the important example of hydrodynamical variables.
8Going the other way – given that worlds are defined in terms of states well-localized in
position and momentum space – consistency follows trivially, and it is relatively easy to see
(from Ehrenfest’s theorem) that states like these obey approximately classical equations (see
Hartle, Chapter 2). Convinced Everettians such as DeWitt, Deutsch, and Vaidman saw no
need for decoherence theory in consequence. (It went almost unmentioned in Deusch [1997]
and in Vaidman [1998], [2002]; when DeWitt did take note of it (De Witt [1993]), he applied
it to branching in the absence of experiments. When induced by experiments ‘Everett has
already dealt with it’.)
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they are atoms and nuclei, as modeled (with great difficulty) in quantum chro-
modynamics and electroweak theory, or phonons, or superconductors, or Bose
condensates, in condensed matter physics – the list goes on and on (what isn’t
emergent ontology?). It is in this sense – so the claim goes – that worlds are
shown to exist in the wave function, rather than be put in by hand. They are
investigated just as is any other emergent ontology in the special sciences.9
If so, doesn’t it follow that many worlds also exist in pilot-wave theory? As
formulated by L. de Broglie in 1927 and by D. Bohm in 1952, the ‘pilot-wave’ just
is the wave-function as given by the Schro¨dinger equation, so it is mathemati-
cally, structurally, identical to the universal state in the Everett interpretation.
Indeed, decoherence theory plays the same essential role in dictating ‘effective’
wave-packet collapse in that theory as it does in the Everett interpretation.10
There follows the gibe: pilot-wave theories are ‘parallel universe theories in a
state of chronic denial’ (Deutsch [1996 p.225])11
A similar consideration applies even to those models of dynamical collapse
in which, from an Everettian point of view, the amplitudes of all worlds save one
are only suppressed (they remain non-zero – and, ‘for all practical purposes’, are
subject only to the unitary evolution). It applies, uncomfortably, to the only
realistic (albeit nonrelativistic) collapse theories so far available, those due to
G. C. Ghirardi and his co-workers (Ghirardi et al [1986], [1990]), in which the
collapse attenuates but does not eliminate altogether components of the state.
In these theories all the structures of the wave-function of the universe as goes
(what on Everettian terms would be) other worlds are still there, their relative
amplitudes all largely unchanged. This is the so-called ‘problem of tails’. On
any broadly structuralist, functionalist approach to the physical sciences, these
structures to the tails are still real.12
The distinctively new feature of the Everett interpretation today is not only
that the preferred basis problem is solved; it is that the very existence of worlds,
of a multiplicity of patterns in the wave-function, each obeying approximately
classical laws, is derived. The fact that they make an unwelcome appearance in
every other form of quantum-state realism, from which they can be removed, if
at all, only with difficulty, proves the point. But there is more.
9This argument is reprised by David Wallace in Chapter 1.
10As Bohm effectively acknowledged when considering the problem of when ‘empty waves’
in pilot-wave theory could be ignored: ‘It should be noted that exactly the same problem arises
in the usual interpretation of the quantum theory, for whenever two packets overlap, then,
even in the usual interpretation, the system must be regarded as, in some sense, covering the
states corresponding to both packets simultaneously.’ (Bohm [1952 p.178 fn.18). Here Bohm
referenced his textbook on quantum mechanics published the previous year, containing an
early treatment of decoherence (Bohm [1951 Ch.6, 16, Sec.25]).
11The argument is made in detail by Brown and Wallace [2005]). In Chapter 16 Antony
Valentini gives a reply, followed by a commentary by Harvey Brown.
12On this point see Tim Maudlin in Chapter 4.
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1.4 Probability and decision theory
Decoherence bears on the probability interpretation if only because it explains
why there is a plurality at all. It shows that some kind of statistical analysis
is perfectly reasonable. But it also undercuts at a stroke the combinatorics
problem. For decoherence comes in degrees; there is no good answer to the
question – How many decohering worlds? Numbers like these can be stipulated,
but from the point of view of the dynamical equations, they would amount
to arbitrary conventions. There is no longer a statistical structure to the set
of branches independent of the amplitudes. The Born rule no longer has an
obvious rival (Saunders [1998]).
At this point, whatever DeWitt’s hopes of deriving the probability inter-
pretation of the theory from the equations, one might hope to settle for the
probability rule as a hypothesis – much as is done, after all, in conventional quan-
tum mechanics. The ontology – the branching structure to the wave-function
– may not force any particular probability measure, very well; then choose one
on empirical grounds. The Born rule is a natural candidate and recovers the
probabilistic predictions of conventional quantum mechanics. Why not simply
postulate it?
But that would be to reinstate a part – a small part, given that decoherence
theory is now dictating the basis, but a part nonetheless – of the measurement
postulates. And on reflection, it is not a wholly uncontentious part. There is a
puzzle, after all, as to whether, being among a superposition of worlds, we are
not in some sense in them all. About to perform a quantum experiment, if the
Everett interpretation is to be believed, all outcomes are obtained. We know
this in advance, so where is there any uncertainty? And this problem can be
lumped with the preferred basis problem: why not let the questions of personal
identity and preferred basis follow together from a theory of mentality, or a
theory of computation, or of quantum information? (Albert and Loewer [1988],
Lockwood [1989], Barrett [1999]). Or be posited, in terms of new axioms, at
the level of worlds? (Deutsch [1985]).
The appeal to mentality is in the tradition of Wheeler and Wigner rather
than that of Everett and DeWitt, and we have turned our backs on it. But still,
it makes it clearer why it is unsatisfactory to simply posit a probability interpre-
tation for the theory. If there is chance in the Everett interpretation, it should
be identified as some objective physical structure, and that structure should be
shown to fill all (or almost all) the chance-roles – including, plausibly, the role of
uncertainty. It cannot just pretend to fill it, or fill it by decree (Greaves [2004]).
However, that may turn out to be more of a linguistic matter than is commonly
thought. As argued by Papineau [1996]), the notion of uncertainty appears to
play no useful role in decision theory.
But there is another chance-role, what the philosopher D. K. Lewis has called the
‘principal principle’, that all are agreed is indispensable. Let S be the statement
that the chance of E at t is p, and suppose our background knowledge K is
‘admissible’ (essentially, that it excludes information as to whether E happened
or not): then our credence in E, conditional on S and K, should be p.
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Here ‘credence’ is subjective probability, degrees of belief. It is probability
in the tradition of F. K. Ramsey, B. De Finetti, and L. Savage. Credence is
what matters to decision theory, statistical inference, and statistical test. So
long as the notion of free-will and agency is not in question in the Everett
interpretation – or no more so than in classical mechanics or pilot-wave theory
– the Ramsey-De Finetti operational characterization of credence in terms of
an agent’s betting behaviour will still be available. If, indeed, their criterion
for consistency among bets — the ‘no Dutch book argument’ – still makes
sense among branching worlds, this all in itself is a solution to the incoherence
objection (that the concept of probability simply makes no sense in the Everett
interpretation): for still, an agent must make reasoned choices among quantum
games.
Very well: probability in the sense of credence may still be implicit in our
behaviour even in a branching universe. But we have been given no reason as
yet as to why it should track some objective counterpart. It seems positively
odd that it should track the mod-squared branch amplitudes, anyway invisible,
as required by the Everettian version of the principal principle.
But no one-world theory of objective probability does very well when it
comes to the principal principle. Of course it can be made to sound rather
trite – why shouldn’t our degree of subjective uncertainty be set equal to the
degree of objective uncertainty? – but that is little more than a play on words.
The answer must ultimately depend on what, concretely, ‘degrees of objective
uncertainty’ (chances) really are. For physicalists, they had better be fixed
by the physical facts – perhaps by the entire sequence of physical facts of a
chance process, or even of all chance processes. But then what sort of physical
facts or quantities, exactly? How can any normal physical quantity, a ‘Humean
magnitude’13 (like mass or relative distance or field intensity), have such a
special place in our rational lives? It is hard for that matter to see how a
problematic quantity like ‘potentiality’ or ‘propensity’ can play this role either.
But if objective probabilities float free of the physical facts altogether, it is even
harder to see why they should matter.
This dilemma was stated by Lewis in a famous passage:
The distinctive thing about chances is their place in the ‘Princi-
pal Principle’, which compellingly demands that we conform our
credences about outcomes to our credences about their chances.
Roughly, he who is certain the coin is fair must give equal credence
to heads and tails....I can see, dimly, how it might be rational to
conform my credences about outcomes to my credences about his-
tory, symmetries, and frequencies. I haven’t the faintest notion how
it might be rational to conform my credences about outcomes to my
credences about some mysterious unHumean magnitude. Don’t try
13After the philosopher D. Hume, who insisted that nothing was available to inspection other
than ‘matters of fact’. The problem that follows is strikingly similar to Hume’s ‘problem of
induction’ (the problem of identifying ‘causes’ rather than ‘chances’ in terms of matters of
fact).
13
to take the mystery away by saying that this unHumean magnitude
is none other than chance! I say that I haven’t the faintest notion
how an unHumean magnitude can possibly do what it must do to
deserve that name - namely, fit into the principle about rationality
of credences – so don’t just stipulate that it bears that name. Don’t
say: here’s chance, now is it Humean or not? Ask: is there any
way that any Humean magnitude could fill the chance-role? Is there
any way that an unHumean magnitude could? What I fear is that
the answer is ‘no’ both times! Yet how can I reject the very idea of
chance, when I know full well that each tritium atom has a certain
chance of decaying at any moment? (Lewis 1986a p.xv-xvi).
Why hasn’t Lewis already given the answer – that chances are made out
in terms of history, symmetries, and frequencies? According to ‘naive frequen-
tism’ probabilities just are actual relative frequencies of outcomes. But we
know the deficiencies of this. Unfortunately, it seems that no sophisticated form
of frequentism is workable either. Lewis put the problem like this: not even
all facts about the actual world, future as well as past, could pin down facts
about probability. If a history-to-chance conditional (the chance is thus-and-
so given such-and-such a sequence of events) is made true by some pattern of
events, past and future, there must be a chance that that pattern happens;
there must be a chance it doesn’t happen. But the pattern that may result
instead may yield a completely different history to chance conditional for the
original pattern. Chance, if supervenient on the actual history of a single world,
is ‘self-undermining’ (Lewis [1986a]).14
Now for the punchline: none of this is a problem in Everettian quantum
mechanics. The self-undermining problem is fairly easily solved. And much less
obviously, the principal principle can be explained. For replace Lewis’ Humean
tapestry of events by an Everettian tapestry of events, connected not only by re-
lations in space and time but also by the new fundamental relations introduced
by quantum mechanics (the transition amplitudes). Then (as argued above) it
has the structure of a collection of branching, approximately classical histories.
Lewis’s question, of why, given this, think the branch amplitudes should dictate
our rational credences, is answered thus: an agent who arranges his preferences
among various branching scenarios – quantum games – in accordance with cer-
tain principles of rationality, must act as if maximizing his expected utilities, as
computed from the Born rule.
This argument was first made by D. Deutsch in his paper ‘Quantum theory
of Probability and Decisions’ [1999]. It was, in essence, a form of Dutch-book
argument, strengthened by appeal to certain symmetries of quantum mechan-
ics. But it hinged on a tacit but relatively powerful assumption subsequently
identified by Wallace as ‘measurement neutrality’ (Wallace ([2002]). It is the
assumption that an agent should be indifferent as to which of several measure-
14For these and other defficiencies of one-world theories of chance, see David Papineau in
Chapter 7. Papineau also defends the claim that the notion of uncertainty plays no useful
role in decision theory.
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ment apparatuses is used to measure a system in a given state, so long as they
are all instruments designed to measure the same dynamical variable (by the
lights of conventional quantum mechanics).
In fact Deutsch [1999] made no explicit mention of the Everett interpre-
tation. If, indeed, experimental procedures are appropriately operationalized,
measurement neutrality is effectively built in (Saunders [2004). But that can
hardly be assumed in the context of the present debate, where it is disputed that
the Everett interpretation recovers the measurement postulates, FAPP (‘for all
practical purposes’), or underwrites ordinary operational procedures.
In face of this, Wallace [2003b, 2007] offered a rather different, two-part
argument. The first was a formal derivation of the Born rule from (rather
weak) axioms of pure rationality, given only, in place of measurement neutral-
ity, ‘equivalence’ – the rule, roughly, that an agent should be indifferent between
experiments that yield exactly the same amplitudes for exactly the same out-
comes. The second part consisted of informal, pragmatic, but still normative
arguments for this rule. This paper attracted wide comment, but primarily by
way of allegedly rational – bizarre perhaps, but rational – counterexamples to
the Born rule. Wallace’s arguments for equivalence were not addressed (or not
by Baker [2006], Lewis [2007], and Hemmo and Pitowsky [2007]).
The upshot: pragmatic and rational constraints force the compliance of an
agent’s expected utilities, as computed from his credences, with his expected
utilities as computed from the Born rule. The result is as good a solution to
Lewis’ dilemma as could be desired – as good as those rational and pragmatic
constraints are judged reasonable15. Obviously they are somewhat idealized; it
is the same with the Dutch book arguments of De Finetti and Ramsey, where an
agent’s utilities are supposedly quantified in terms of (relatively small) financial
rewards; but so long as nothing question-begging or underhand is going on,
Wallace’s result is already a milestone. Nothing similar has been achieved for
any one-world physical theory.
Why is that exactly? Is it for want of perseverance or ingenuity? Perhaps;
the same general strategy is available to any other probability theory that lays
down meaningful pragmatic constraints, independent of its interpretation in
terms of probability (examples that come to mind include classical statistical
mechanics and pilot-wave theory). But Everettian quantum mechanics is special
in another respect. As Wallace points out, at the heart of his arguments for the
equivalence rule (and Deutsch’s original argument) is a certain symmetry – the
case of the equi-amplitude outcomes – that cannot possibly be respected in any
one-world theory. A tossed coin in any one-world theory must land one way or
the other. However perfect the symmetry of the coin, this symmetry cannot be
respected (not even approximately) by the dynamics governing its motion on
any occasion on which it is actually thrown. But it can in Everettian quantum
mechanics.16
15In Chapter 8 by David Wallace these constraints are written down as axioms, and the
entire argument is formalized.
16This point, in the related context of quantum mechanical symmetry-breaking, was ear-
lier recognized by Zeh [1975]). (To ward of any possible confustion: this is not Wallace’s
15
This link with rationality is not all of the meaning of physical probability, how-
ever. It is not even the only link needed with credence. The two come together
also in statistical inference – in inference from observed statistics to objective
probabilities, in accordance, say, with Bayesianism. This applies, above all, to
confirming or disconfirming quantum theory itself; to confirming or disconfirm-
ing statements about probabilities made by the theory on the basis of observed
statistics.
The difficulty in the case of the Everett interpretation is that failing an
antecedent understanding of branch amplitudes in terms of probability, the pre-
dictions of the theory don’t speak of probabilities at all: they speak only of
branch amplitudes. The theory predicts not that the more probable statistics
are such-and-such, but that the statistics in higher amplitude branches are such-
and-such. Suppose such-and-such statistics are observed; why is that reason to
believe the theory is confirmed? Or if not, that it is disconfirmed?
The principal principle normally does this job, converting probabilities, as
given by a physical theory, into degrees of belief. But we lack at this point any
comparable principle for converting branch amplitudes into degrees of belief.
The quantum decision theory argument is in this context unavailable – it forces
the principal principle only for an agent who already accepts that his pragmatic
situation is as dictated by the branching structure of the wave function. If
you believe that is true, then you are already half-way to believing Everettian
quantum mechanics is true. And if you don’t: then the gap is as wide as ever.
Call this the ‘evidential problem’. It was a relative newcomer to the debate
over the Everett interpretation (Wallace [2002], Myrvold [2005]). However, a
general strategy for solving the problem was rather quickly proposed by H.
Greaves. Define a more general (Bayesian) confirmation theory in which the
principle principal governs, not credence, which necessarily involves the notion of
uncertainty, but ‘quasicredence’ – which, say, quantifies one’s concerns (a ‘caring
measure’), rather than uncertainties – subject to two constraints: conditional
on the proposition that E occurs with chance p, it is to be set equal to p; and
conditional on the proposition that E occurs on branches with weight p, it is to
be set equal to p.
If quasicredences are updated by Bayesian conditionalization, and if degrees
of belief in theories (whether branching or non-branching theories) are marginals
of this quasicredence function, then they behave just as one would desire in the
context of rival theories. That is, the resulting confirmation theory can adju-
dicate between a chance theory and a weighted-branching theory, and between
rival weighted-branching theories (if there are such), and rival chance theories,
without prejudice to any (Greaves [2007]). Most important of all, it passes the
obvious test: it does not confirm a branching theory come what may, whatever
the branch weights17.
Evidently, it also by-passes the question of whether or not there is any uncer-
tainty in the Everett picture – of whether or not Everettian quantum mechanics
equivalence rule, but only a very special case of it.).
17In Chapter 9 Hilary Greaves in collaboration with Wayne Myrvold essentially derive this
confirmation theory as a Savage-style representation theorem.
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is a theory of probability at all – a strategy she had introduced earlier (Greaves
[2004]). It has been dubbed the ‘fission programme’. The evidential problem, in
other words, can be solved regardless of one’s views on questions of uncertainty
in the context of branching. Both Deutsch and Wallace similarly avoided any
appeal to the notion of uncertainty.
But now suppose, for the sake of argument, that all these arguments do go
through. If so many of the chance-roles can be shown to be played by branch-
ing and branch amplitudes, can they not be identified with chance (Saunders
[2005], Wallace [2006])? Is it any different in the identification of, say, ther-
mal quantities, with certain kinds of particle motions? Or temporal quantities,
with certain functions on a spacetime manifold? There remains the question of
what sense, if any, attaches to the notion of uncertainty – given, for the sake of
argument, complete knowledge of the wave function – but contra Greaves and
others, a case can be made on the side of uncertainty too. For take a world as
a complete history, and ourselves at some time as belonging to a definite world.
There are vast numbers of worlds, all exactly alike up to that time. We do not
know what the future will bring, because we do not know which of these worlds
is our own (Wallace [2006], Saunders and Wallace [2008]).18
The issue is in part – perhaps in large part – a matter of how we talk about
future contingencies. There is already a comparable difficulty in talk of the
past and future, and of change, in the ‘block universe’ picture of 4−dimensional
spacetime – and plenty of scope there to interpret our ordinary talk in nonsen-
sical terms. Lots of philosophers (and some physicists) have. For most of us,
however, in that context, it is more reasonable to make sense of ordinary talk of
change in terms of the relations among events (‘before’, ‘after’, and ‘simultane-
ous’ – or ‘spacelike’), treating words like ‘now’ as we do spatial demonstratives
like ‘here’ (Saunders [1995, 1996b, 1998]). We make sense of ordinary talk of
time and change in terms of the physics, not nonsense.
Or take the example of sensory perception: what do we perceive by the
senses, if physics is to be believed? Nothing but our own ideas, according to
most philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. We directly
see only sense data, or retinal stimuli; everything else is inferred. Hence the
‘problem of the external world’. Well, it may be a problem of philosophy, but
as a proposal for linguistic reform it is a non-starter. That would be another
example of bad interpretative practises.
A better practise, by a wide margin, is ‘the principle of charity’ (Wallace
[2005]): interpretation (or translation) that preserves truth (or, this a variant,
that preserves knowledge). But some may conclude from all this that if all that
is at issue is our ordinary use of words, rather less hangs on the question of
uncertainty than might have been thought – and on whether branching and
branch amplitudes ‘really is’ probability. The success of the fission programme
points to that.
But whether the fission programme can be judged a success, whether, indeed,
18I argue the case for this account of branching in Chapter 6.
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any of the arguments just summarized really succeed in their aim, is what this
book aims to discover.
2 The arguments of the book
The book is structured in six parts. Parts 1 and 2 are on ontology in the Everett
interpretation, giving constructive and critical arguments respectively. Part 3 is
on probability; Part 4, critical of many worlds, is largely focused on this. Part
5 is on alternatives to many worlds, consistent with realism and the unitary
formalism of quantum mechanics. Part 6 collects chapters that are friendly to
many worlds but essentially concern something else –the origins of the theory,
its reception, its open questions.
Ontology, probability, alternatives, and open questions; we take them each
by turn.
2.1 Ontology
A general objection on the grounds of ontology is that decoherence theory does
not do what is claimed because decoherence is only approximate and context-
dependent. In some regimes it is too slow to give classicality, or it is absent
altogether.
These and related arguments are addressed by David Wallace in Chapter
1. There he presents an outlook on realism in general and on ‘emergence’ in
particular. The extraction of quasiclassical equations – a whole class of such,
one for each history – is an example of FAPP reasoning as it operates across the
board in the special sciences, according to Wallace. The framework is broadly
structuralist and functionalist, in roughly the sense of D. Dennett’s writings. It
may be true that one has to know what one is looking for in advance, by means of
which effective, phenomenological equations are obtained, but it is the same for
extracting equations for protons, nuclei, and atoms from the field equations of
the Standard Model. Likewise for quasi-particles in condensed matter physics,
or (a big jump this) living organisms in molecular biology – and from thence to
anatomy, evolutionary biology, and the rest. The fact that in certain regimes
decoherence is absent altogether – that classicality, branching, and worlds, are
absent altogether – is, says Wallace, scarcely a difficulty. It is not as though we
need to recover a theory of biology for all possible regimes of molecular physics,
in order to have such a theory for some.
If Wallace’s reading of the extraction of classicality from the quantum is
correct, it had better apply to the decoherence theory as it is actually applied. In
Chapter 2 Jim Hartle gives an overview of the field of decohering histories, whilst
in Chapter 3 Jonathan Halliwell gives a detailed model in terms of so-called
‘hydrodynamical’ variables, one of the most realistic models to date. Readers
are invited to judge for themselves.
A second objection is at first sight more philosophical, but it can be read as
a continuation of the first. How does talk of macroscopic objects so much as get
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off the ground? What is the deep-down ontology in the Everett interpretation?
It can’t just be wave-function, argues Tim Maudlin in Chapter 4; it is simply
unintelligible to hold that a function on a high dimensional space represents
something physically real, unless and until we are told what it is a function of –
of what inhabits that space, what the elements of the function’s domain are. If
they are particle configurations, then there had better be particle configurations,
in which case not only the wave function is real.
Here one can hardly take instruction from the special sciences, where in-
strumentalism (or at least agnosticism) about ontology at deeper levels is a
commonplace. In any case it would be question-begging, by Maudlin’s lights,
as failing an account of what exists at the fundamental ontology we do not
have emergent structures either. But on that point Wallace and Maudlin differ
profoundly.
But don’t the chapters by Hartle and Halliwell prove otherwise? No – not
according to Maudlin. They help themselves to resources they are not entitled
to in the context of realism. Physicists indifferent to the question of realism in
quantum mechanics may well speak of a function over particle configurations19;
others may speak in the same way – doing the same calculations, even – but with
a hidden-variable theory in mind. But when the topic is realism in quantum
mechanics commitments like this have to be made explicitly. Compare the
situation in pilot-wave theory and collapse theories, where in recent years the
question of fundamental ontology has received a great deal of attention. So: if
it is denied that particles or fields exist and that only the wave function is real,
then the wave function is not a function of particle or field configurations. So
of what is it a function?
One can try to treat this challenge as only a verbal dispute – very well, let’s
speak of ‘quantum-state realism’ or ‘structure-of-the-state realism’ instead. But
the objection is at bottom a request for clarification, for an intelligible account
of the microworld. So what does it consist in, exactly? Or even in outline? (See
also Section 3.4.)
Agreed, this question of fundamental ontology is important. It is a shame
that it has been paid so little attention. That is the main complaint made
by David Deutsch in Chapter16 – Maudlin finds an unlikely bed-fellow. The
difference between them, to put it in Bayesian terms, is in their priors: Maudlin
unlike Deutsch is sceptical that any solution is possible. Maudlin sees pilot-
wave and collapse theories as examples of how ontological questions should be
settled, but he doubts that anything like the methods used there can apply to
many worlds. There again, much of that debate has been driven by the challenge
that their ontologies too contain many worlds, and devising ways by which they
can be eliminated.
Is there some metatheoretic perspective available? Are there general philo-
sophical guidelines for conducting debates like these? John Hawthorne in Chap-
ter 5 tries, with certain caveats, to say what they might be. His is a metaphysical
image to counter the naturalistic one given in Wallace’s chapter. He reminds us
19Hartle and Halliwell both steer clear of questions of realism in quantum foundations.
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of the long-standing concern in philosophy over how the gap between the ‘mani-
fest’ image and fundamental ontology – or the ‘fundamental book of the world’,
as Hawthorne puts it – can be bridged. He proposes a demarcation between
‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ strategies, where the former is straightforwardly an
identification of macro-descriptions with descriptions at the fundamental level.
The latter in contrast involves ‘metaphysical generational principles’: these he
(rightly) thinks are rejected by Everettians. But if only identifications of the
former kind are available, their task, thinks Hawthorne, is much harder. Typical
of identificatory projects in science – by means of ‘bridge principles’, for exam-
ple, as was popular in logical empiricist philosophy of science – are ‘uncloseable
explanatory gaps’, bridge principles that are claimed to be true ‘but you can’t
see for the life of you, no matter how much you look, why they are true while
certain competing principles are false’ (p.149). That is particularly familiar in
philosophy of mind where the explanatory gap between descriptions in terms of
consciousness and physicalistic descriptions is widely acknowledged. According
to Hawthorne, the Everett interpretation threatens to bring with it too many
new, uncloseable explanatory gaps.
But if the example is the mind-body problem, isn’t functionalism precisely
an answer to that? Perhaps – but there at least some input-output facts about
stimulus and behaviour are uncontroversially in place. Not so in the Everett
interpretation, argues Hawthorne, where ‘it is hard to know what the take-home
message of the functionalist is in a setting where none of the fundamental-to-
macro associations are given.’ (p.150).
The second lesson that emerges from Hawthorne’s analysis is the importance
of what he calls ‘metasemantical’ principles – broadly speaking, theories of how
semantical rules ought to operate for connecting predicates to ontology (funda-
mental or otherwise). One can play lip-service to the macro-image that still fails
to square with one’s favoured metasemantical principles – some kind of fudge
is needed. Very well, so take a theory in which, say, ‘all there is to the world is
configuration space’. Then the best package, all things considered, is one that
has ordinary macro-predicates (like Wallace’s example, ‘tiger’) pick out features
of configuration space. Everettians, says Hawthorne, are then tempted to argue
as follows:
But this shows that certain features of configuration space are good
enough to count as tigers. And then the line of reasoning proceeds as
follows: “Even if there were extra stuff – throw Bohmian particles or
whatever into the mix – we have agreed that the relevant features of
configuration space are good enough to count as tigers. So whether
or not that extra stuff is floating around, you should still count those
features of configuration space as tigers” (p.152).
But introduce ‘extra stuff’, and it may be its credentials to count as things like
tigers simply swamps those of the configuration-space features that you were
stuck with before.
It may be, but does it? According to James Ladyman, in his reply to
Hawthorne, the credentials of the ‘empty waves’ of pilot-wave theory seems no
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better or worse than the occupied ones (we shall have to revisit this argument
when we come to Part 5 of the book). Ladyman wonders too if they are mostly
about philosophical intuitions that we have no good reason to trust – which
are themselves the object of empirical investigation in cognitive science. But
more importantly, and the point to which he devotes most attention, he thinks
Hawthorne’s alternative methodologies (the conservative and liberal strategies)
are not exhaustive. For example, identifications in the physical sciences are gen-
erally dynamical – ‘it is the dynamics of how hydrogen bonds form, disband, and
reform that gives rise to the wateriness of water and not the mere aggregation
of hydrogen and oxygen in the ration of two to one’ (p.158). It is one of many
devices used by Halliwell and Hartle that go beyond Hawthorne’s two-part dis-
tinction, according to Ladyman (he lists a number of them). When it comes to
the explanatory gap between the quantum world and the macroworld, contrary
to Hawthorne’s claim that none of the fundamental-to-macro associations are
given, Ladyman concludes, ‘it must be acknowledged that Halliwell and Hartle
do much to close it’ (p.159).
Here is an entirely different line of attack. Might some of the devices used by
Halliwell and Hartle be question-begging, in view of later discussions of probabil-
ity? According to Adrian Kent in Chapter 10 and Wojciech Zurek in Chapter13,
any appeal to decoherence theory must already presuppose the idea of proba-
bility. Decoherence theory employs reduced density matrices and the trace ‘and
so their predictions are based on averaging’ (Zurek, p.410). In the estimation
of Kent, it shows that certain operators ‘approximately quantifying local mass
densities approximately follow classical equations of motion with probability
close to one...in other words, the ontology is defined by applying the Born rule.’
(p.338). The criticism is potentially damaging to those, like Saunders and Wal-
lace, who seek to identify probability (or at any rate identify the quantities that
a rational agent should treat as if they were probabilities) with some aspect of
the ontology. Allow that the branching structure of the universal state involves
objective probabilities in its definition and their arguments all but evaporate.
Zurek and Kent surely have a point: those working in decoherent histories
talk freely of probabilities in their interpretation of branch structures. Witness
Jonathan Halliwell in Chapter 3 in his derivation of quasiclassical hydrodynam-
ical equations from the unitary formalism:
The final picture we have is as follows. We can imagine an initial
state for the system which contains superpositions of macroscopi-
cally very distinct states. Decoherence of histories indicates that
these states may be treated separately and we thus obtain a set of
trajectories which may be regarded as exclusive alternatives each oc-
curring with some probability. Those probabilities are peaked about
the average values of the local densities. We have argued that each
local density eigenstate may then tend to local equilibrium, and a set
of hydrodynamic equations for the average values of the local den-
sities then follow. We thus obtain a statistical ensemble of trajecto-
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ries, each of which obeys hydrodynamic equations. These equations
could be very different from one trajectory to the next, having, for
example, significantly different values of temperature. In the most
general case they could even be in different phases, for example one
a gas, one a liquid. (p.111)
But here Halliwell, like Hartle, assumes the mod-squared amplitudes of histories
can be interpreted as probabilities: he is neutral on whether all of these histories
exist. Everettians at this point must speak in terms of amplitudes instead.
The key question for them is whether the notion of the ‘average values’ of the
local densities, on which the amplitudes are peaked, presupposes the notion of
probability, or whether they are called the average values of the local densities
because they are the values on which the amplitudes are peaked. The latter will
follow if and when it is shown that the amplitudes can be interpreted in terms
of probabilities – this, they say, is a task that can come after the delineation of
the branching structure.
2.2 Probability
But is it probability?
Chapter 6 by Simon Saunders makes the case for identifying branching and
squared norms of branch amplitudes with chance processes and objective prob-
abilities. To that end he identifies three roles played by chance. They can at
best be measured by statistics, and only then with high chance; they guide ra-
tional action in the same way that objective probabilities are supposed to guide
rational action, as spelt out by the principal principle; and chance processes in-
volve uncertainty. His argument in a nutshell: all three of these roles are played
by branching and branch amplitudes in Everettian quantum mechanics. Since
they are more or less definitional of chance – no explanation of them is given in
any conventional physical theory of probability – anything that plays all these
roles should be identified with chance.
Of these the link with statistics is a straightforward dynamical question.
Amplitudes cannot be measured directly in the Everett interpretation because
the equation of motion is unitary. They show up at best in the statistics of
repeated trials, but only on branches of comparatively high amplitude. This,
says Saunders, can be uncontroversially explained.
For the argument for the link with rational action, we are referred to Wal-
lace’s chapter. The rest of Chapter 6 is on the link with uncertainty. It argues,
in brief, that branching implies a form of ‘self-locating uncertainty’ – uncertainty
as to which branch is our own. He reminds us that here there is a difficulty well
known to philosophers. Suppose a large number of distinct histories are real,
but that they share common parts, rather in the way that roads can overlap or,
well, the way branches of a tree can overlap. Philosophers call worlds like these
‘branching’. But then:
The trouble with branching exactly is that it conflicts with our ordi-
nary presuppositions that we have a single future. if two futures are
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equally mine, one with a sea fight tomorrow and one without, it is
nonsense to wonder which way it will be – it will be both ways – and
yet I do wonder. The theory of branching suits those who think this
wondering is nonsense. Or those who think the wondering makes
sense only if reconstrued: you have leave to wonder about the sea
fight, provided that really you wonder not about what tomorrow will
bring but about what today predetermines. But a modal realist who
thinks in the ordinary way that it makes sense to wonder what the
future will bring, and who distinguishes this from wondering what is
already predetermined, will reject branching in favour of divergence.
In divergence also there are many futures; that is, there are many
later segments of worlds that begin by duplicating initial segments
of our world. But in divergence, only one of these futures is truly
ours. The rest belong not to us but to our otherworldly counterparts.
(Lewis [1986b p.208]).
The initial segments of diverging worlds are only qualitatively, not numerically,
identical.
Why not just choose divergence, then? Because things are not so simple
for physicalists. Their metaphysics, if they have any, is constrained by physical
theory. Indeed, Everett introduced the term ‘branching’ by reference to the
development of a superposition of records of histories, ultimately in terms of
vector-space structure, not by the philosophers’ criterion of overlap. According
to Saunders, this concept of branches finds a natural mathematical expression in
the language of the consistent histories formalism with its attendant Heisenberg-
picture vectors – an inherently tenseless 4−dimensional perspective. Do worlds
thus represented overlap, in the philosophers’ sense, or do they diverge? The
answer, he says, is underdetermined by the physics;20 either metaphysical pic-
ture will do. But if either can be used, better use the one that makes sense of
ordinary linguistic usage, rather than nonsense.
But this argument for the identification of branching and branch ampli-
tudes with objective probability is of no use in explaining the Born rule; on
the contrary it depends on it. And whilst, according to Saunders, it gives an
indirect solution to the evidential problem, the remaining chapters of Part 3
favour rather the fission programme due to Hilary Greaves, in which – if only
as a tactical move – talk of uncertainty is eschewed. David Papineau in Chap-
ter 7 goes further: he questions the very desirability of an account of quantum
probability in terms of uncertainty. According to him rational choice theory is
better off without it. The strategy of maximizing one’s expected utilities, he
argues, faces a difficulty if what one really wants is the best utility – but this
problem disappears in the fission picture.
Adrian Kent in Chapter 10 challenges the argument for uncertainty directly.
To bring in linguistic considerations, Kent insists, is simply a mistake: nothing
20A point remarked on, but not taken properly to heart, in Saunders [1998 p.399-401]. The
presumption, that Everettian branching is branching in the philosophers’ sense as well, is
widely shared by philosophers of physics.
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of significance to fundamental physics could turn on such questions. And the
bottom line, the real reason there can be no uncertainty in the face of branching,
is that there is nothing in the physics corresponding to it. Take the case of Alice,
about to perform a Stern-Gerlach experiment. If she were to be unsure of what
to expect, there would have to be ‘a probabilistic evolution law taking brain
state |O〉A to one of the states |i〉A.’ (p.20). There is no such law; indeed,
‘nothing in the mathematics corresponds to “Alice, who will see spin up” or
“Alice, who will see spin down”.’ (p.346). Kent disagrees with the arguments
of Part 1 that there are such laws, albeit only effective laws. He disagrees with
Saunders that branch vectors are just the needed mathematical quantities.
The Born-rule theorem
In Chapter 8 Wallace provides a formal derivation of the Born-rule, making it
properly speaking a theorem. Mathematically-inclined readers are invited to
check its validity for themselves.
But are his axioms reasonable? They are in part pragmatic constraints –
constraints on the range and kind of acts that are available to an agent if the
branching structure of the wave function is what Everettian quantum mechanics
says it is. One of them (‘state supervenience’) is an expression of physicalism:
it says that an agent’s preferences between acts should depend only on what
state they leave his branch in. Others again are more overly rationalistic – rules
that are applicable more or less whatever the physical theory.
Of these there are only two. The first is that an agent’s preferences must
yield a total ordering on his available actions. The reason for this is not so much
that the claim appears plausible (although Wallace thinks it is), it is that ‘it
isn’t even possible, in general for an agent to formulate and act upon a coherent
set of preferences violating ordering’. (p.236).
The other is ‘diachronic consistency’: suppose an agent on performing act
U has successors all of whom prefer act V to act V ′; then that agent had
better prefer U followed by V to U followed by V ′. The rational is roughly
the same. Local violations of this rule may be possible, Wallace admits; thus
I disengenuously tell my friend not to let me order another glass of wine after
my second; but ‘[i]n the presence of widespread, generic violation of diachronic
consistency, agency in the Everett universe is not possible at all.’ (p.237).
Diachronic consistency is constitutive of agency, in Wallace’s view.
As for the point of the axiomatization, it is that rather than pursue largely
sterile arguments over the intuitive plausibility (or lack of it) to various counter-
examples to the Born rule, attention can be shifted to the general principles
that putatively underlie our actual epistemic practises. To that end, for each
alleged counter-example to the Born rule, Wallace identifies the relevant axiom
or axioms that it most obviously sleights.
Chapters in Part 4 are uniformly in disagreement with Wallace’s conclusions.
According to Huw Price in Chapter 12, the key problem is that in moving
from one world to many there is “something new for agents to have preferences
about ’ (p.370). He gives an example from political philosophy. Use of the Born
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rule, in that context, would amount to a form of utilitarianism (maximizing
expected utility according to a certain credence function), but to that there
are well-known alternatives. Why not impose some form of distributive justice
instead, in which the lot of the worse off is disproportionately weighted? This
is a developed and much-debated theory in political philosophy; it is simply
not credible to contend it is irrational. It may be the amplitudes will have to
enter into any quantitative rule, there being no a priori count of successors,
but no matter: the rule thus amended will still reflect distributive rather than
utilitarian goals, and hence differ from the Born rule.
It is a good question whether Price thinks this argument is independent of
the notion of uncertainty. He grants that (‘subjective’) uncertainty may make
sense in the context of branching on a certain metaphysics of personal identity,
at least as first-person expectations go (citing Wallace [2006]), but he denies it
can account for uncertainty more generally. For example, he doubts it makes
sense for events occurring long after an agent can possibly hope to survive. And
in short: he insists metaphysical questions of personal identity be kept separate
from decision theory.
But Everettians on that point can guardedly agree. Where then is the source
of disagreement? His counterexample violates one or other of Wallace’s axioms,
obviously. That doesn’t bother Price: he concludes that is only to show they
tacitly smuggle in presuppositions appropriate to a one-world theory. As it
happens, Wallace identifies the relevant axiom as more obviously a pragmatic
constraint (a continuity axiom), but the real disagreement between them is
closer to the surface. Price insists that in decision theory considerations of
rationality pertain to a single moment in time (the time at which a decision
is made). For this reason, decision theory has nothing to do with questions
of personal identity even of the most deflationary kind. Price will therefore
reject Wallace’s axiom of diachronic consistency directly. On personal identity,
he says, ‘[t]hese issues are essentially irrelevant to classical subjective decision
theory, for whom the only ‘I’ who matters is the ‘I’ at the time of decision’
(p.377).
Adrian Kent in Chapter 10 seeks to undermine the Born rule theorem at
several levels. There is a problem with the very idea of ‘fuzzy’ ontology or the-
ory. Kent wonders how, if the branching structure is fuzzy, the mathematical
precision required of the Born-rule theorem can be sustained. Mathematical
precision, moreover, is not just desirable: according to Kent, one has an ‘obliga-
tion to strive to express one’s ideas in mathematics as far as possible’ (p.346).
That is the mistake of arguments from the philosophy of language: they still
bring assumptions, it is just that since expressed only in words they are the
more vague. Kent speaks at this point specifically of a theory of mind. Here he
rejects the broadly functionalist stance of Everettians on questions of mentality.
They in turn will readily welcome mathematical models of neural processes, or
for that matter linguistic behaviour, but see no special role for either in quantum
foundations.
Like Price, Kent offers a number of counterexamples to the Born rule. One
is the ‘future self elitist’, who cares only about the best of his successors (‘the
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rest are all losers’). Another is the ‘rivalrous future self elitist’, who cares in
contrast only about the one that is the best relative to the others – someone like
this will see an advantage in impoverishing all of his successors save one. And
he points out the variety of (conflicting) ways in which notions like these can
be quantified. They may not be particularly edifying forms of caring, true, but
they are surely not irrational – or not when directed at a community of other
people, none of them oneself.
Kent addresses Wallace’s rationality axioms explicitly. In the case of inter-
temporal consistency, he concludes that whilst on some occasions an agent may
reasonably be required to be consistent over time, on other occasions not. When
an agent’s utilities change over time, inter-temporal consistency, Kent thinks, is
impossible. His conclusion:
The best it seems to me that one might hope to say of diachronic
consistency in real world decisions is that pretty often, in the short
term, it approximately holds. Clearly, that isn’t a strong enough
assumption to prove an interesting decision theoretic representation
theorem. (p.342).
David Albert’s criticisms in Chapter 11 chime with many of Kent’s. He
adds the concern that an analysis of probability in the physical sciences in
terms of the betting strategy of a rational agent is to simply change the topic –
it isn’t what a theory of physical chance is about. What we should be doing is
explaining the observed statistics – in effect, our task is to solve the evidential
problem. No inquiry into the nature of the pragmatic constraints on rational
actors that might follow from Everettian quantum theory can ever be relevant
to that question. The fact that an agent is required to believe the theory is true
for Wallace’s Born-rule theorem to even get going shows it is irrelevant.
But even on its own, rather limited terms, Albert continues, Wallace’s argu-
ments are unsatisfactory. Counter-examples to the equivalence rule, and there-
fore the Born rule, can easily be constructed. The one Albert favours is the
one generalized by Kent as the ‘rivalrous future self-elitist’: the successors that
matter are those that the agent considers better in comparison to the others,
specifically by being fatter than the others (this gives them extra gravitas). No
matter if the rule is absurd (it was intended to be funny), or difficult to carry
through in practise, it is not irrational. Albert further insists that pragmatic
constraints should have nothing to do with questions of what it is right to do.
In fact Wallace’s response is that Albert’s ‘fatness rule’ violates inter-temporal
consistency rather than any of the more obviously pragmatic constraints – but of
course, the latter are needed in the deduction as well. More fundamentally: for
Wallace the distinction between rationality rules and pragmatic rules is anyway
only a matter of degree.
The evidential problem
How then is Everettian quantum mechanics to be confirmed or disconfirmed by
statistical evidence? The theory only says that statistics conforming to the Born
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rule obtain on branches of comparatively high amplitudes, whereas anomalous
statistics obtain on branches of comparatively low amplitude. How is that to
be empirically checked?
Recall the answer given earlier by Greaves [2007]: a general theory of statisti-
cal inference can be defined that applies equally to branching and non-branching
theories (without prejudice to either). Very well: such a confirmation theory
can be defined; but why should sceptics embrace it? In Chapter 9, in collabo-
ration with Wayne Myrvold, she argues that they must. Greaves and Myrvold
show that the process of Bayesian conditionalization (updating of credences)
can itself be operationalized in terms of betting preferences, where the latter
are constrained by Savage’s axioms. The process of statistical inference from
the outcomes of an experiment, treated as ‘exchangeable’ in De Finetti’s sense,
follows in train.
This takes some unpacking. The operational definition of an agent’s condi-
tional credences C(E|F ) is well known from Ramsey’s and De Finetti’s writings:
it is the betting quotient that an agent is prepared to accept for event E, on
the understanding that the bet is called off if F does not happen. It is easy to
show that unless this credence satisfies the probability axiom:
C(E|F ) = C(E&F )
C(F )
.
a Dutch book can be constructed by which an agent is bound to lose, whatever
happens. Note that the credence functions on the RHS are defined prior to
learning that F .
As it stands, this says nothing about how an agent’s credence function should
be updated in the light of new evidence. But let this be on the model of a ‘pure
learning experience’, in Greaves and Myrvold’s terminology: then, they show,
C(.|F ) should indeed be her updated credence function (Bayesian conditional-
ization). For suppose:
P7. During pure learning experiences, the agent adopts the strategy
of updating preferences between wagers that, on her current prefer-
ences, she ranks highest.
Then, in pure learning experiences, an agent’s preferences among wagers, in
conformity with Savage’s axioms and P7, induces an ordering of preferences on
updating strategies. Bayesian conditionalization comes out as optimal.
Meanwhile, Greaves and Myrvold remind us, De Finetti’s original represen-
tation theorem already shows how an agent who treats the order of a sequence
of outcomes on repeated trials of an experimental set-up as irrelevant (as ‘ex-
changeable’, in De Finetti’s terminology), and who updates her credences by
conditionalization in accordance with Bayes’ theorem, is inter alia committed
to treating the outcomes of the experiment as if they were associated with def-
inite, if unknown, probabilities.
Putting the two together, the result is an operational characterization of the
entire process of Bayesian statistical inference. It is in fact a representation
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theorem just as much as is the Born-rule theorem – like it or not, agents who
subscribe to the axioms P1− P7, and who believe certain experiments are ex-
changeable, have to act as if they were updating their quasicredence functions,
in the manner proposed by Greaves [2007], and accordingly, updating their
credences in theories. Add the requirement that ones priors not be fixed dog-
matically (they can be as small as you like, but not zero), their axiom P8, and
the resulting confirmation theory passes a variety of non-triviality tests as well.
Most importantly: it doesn’t follow that because (in some sense) everything
happens, according to Everett, the theory is confirmed come what may.
The authors’ challenge is now as follows. Set up the entire system of axioms
in accordance with the background assumption that one has a conventional
theory of chance. Now entertain the possibility that the Everett interpretation
is true. How much of the framework has to be changed? The answer, according
to Greaves and Myrvold, is ‘none of it’ (p.284). None of their axioms make
explicit mention of uncertainty, chance, or probability (and nor, so they claim,
do they implicitly).
To all of this a variety of the objections to Wallace’s methods apply. Some of
them, for example Price’s counter-example in terms of distributive justice, are
addressed explicitly by Greaves and Wallace (see their ‘answers to objections’).
But the main objection, according to Albert, is that the very focus on wagers and
games is misguided. Preferences of rational agents in their gambling strategies,
however regimented (as in Savage’s axioms), can have nothing to do with the
task of explaining the statistics actually observed. At most they tell us how
much we should bet that we will find evidence E, if we believe a scientific
hypothesis H is true, not with what the probability of E is if H were true (what
we ordinarily take as an explanation, if the probability is sufficiently high, of
evidence E). And betting, in the fission picture, at least once the structure of
branching and amplitudes are all known, is a matter of caring about what goes
on in some worlds, not beliefs about what happens in those worlds. In Albert’s
words:
But remember (and this is the absolutely crucial point) that decid-
ing whether or not to bet on E, in the fission picture, has nothing
whatsoever to do with guessing at whether or not E is going to oc-
cur. It is, for sure. And so is −E. And the business of deciding how
to bet is just a matter of maximizing the payoffs on those particular
branches that – for whatever reason – I happen to care most about.
And if one is careful to keep all that at the centre of one’s attention,
and if one is careful not to be misled by the usual rhetoric of ‘mak-
ing a bet’, then the epistemic strategy that Greaves and Myrvold
recommend suddenly looks silly and sneaky and unmotivated and
wrong. (p.16-17).
The objection is not quite that information about self-location can have
nothing to do with beliefs about whether a physical theory is true – or if it is,
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it is Objection 5, as considered and rejected by Greaves and Myrvold. It is that
the process of confirmation in accordance with the axioms P1−P8, in the case
of branching worlds, is no longer explanatory. Indeed, the axioms themselves
may no longer be reasonable. Could they be corrected? But there may be
no reasonable rules at all by which one can statistically test for a theory of
branching worlds, say Albert and Kent. One can always concoct rules by which
agents in each branch will arrive at beliefs about weights of branches, on the
basis of the statistics in that branch; but they will arrive at those beliefs even
if a branching worlds theory were true in which there were no branch weights
(Kent’s ‘weightless’ case, p.325-26).
Mightn’t a similar pathology arise in a one-world theory in which there is
no law, deterministic or probabilistic, governing the outcomes of experiments?
Again, the inhabitants of such a world will conclude, falsely, that another the-
ory is true – one that does assign the observed outcomes weights (namely, for
experimental set-ups treated as exchangeable, weights numerically equal to the
observed relative frequencies). But says Kent, there is an important difference.
In the case of many worlds, the inhabitants of each world are led to construct a
spurious measure of importance that favours their own observations against the
others’. ‘[T]his leads to an obvious absurdity. In the one-world case, observers
treat what actually happened as important, and ignore what didn’t happen:
this doesn’t lead to the same difficulty’. (p.327).
A related disquiet, as made vivid by Kent’s example of a ‘decorative’ weight
multiverse (p.327-28), is that in the Greaves-Myrvold approach the notion of
branch weight is treated as a primitive, with different assignment of weights
counted as different theories. On one theory they may be given by the moduli
squared of branch amplitudes, but on another – possibly, a theory with identical
dynamics and universal state – the weights are an entirely different set of num-
bers altogether. So (as Albert puts it) there is either some additional physical
fact about the world (giving up on the main goal of the Everett interpretation,
which is to make do with the unitary theory), or else the branch weights are
some non-physical facts that are supposedly confirmed or disconfirmed by the
observation of relative frequencies.
We have seen this disquiet before. It is the same as Lewis’: surely branch
weights cannot, any more than objective probabilities, float free of the physical
facts. They should be dictated by them essentially. But on this point, say
Greaves and Myrvold, their arguments are entirely neutral (p.397-98). The
objection, if pressed, anyway can be met by the Deutsch-Wallace theorem; and
if it isn’t pressed: then it is hardly a difficulty of their confirmation theory that
this freedom is permitted. Something is measured, they claim, in the way that
probabilities are, by an agent who obeys their axioms: any theory that predicts
the value of that quantity is thus subject to empirical test.
2.3 Not (only) many worlds.
The remaining parts of the book bring in wider considerations. Part 5 is on
realist alternatives to many worlds consistent with the unitary formalism of
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quantum mechanics. They go against the claim that the Everett interpreta-
tion is forced by realism alone. Part 6 is about open questions – historical,
methodological, and conceptual – inspired by many worlds.
Alternatives to many worlds
Wojciech Zurek in Chapter 13 sketches a one-world picture of reality in which
the quantum state has a qualified ontological status. It is only a sketch: he cites
a sizable literature (by himself and his co-workers) for the details. From an Ev-
erettian point of view, a key difference lies in his notion of ‘objective existence’.
This notion only applies, according to Zurek, to ‘classical’ states – ‘einselected’
states – states that can be investigated in a ‘pragmatic and operational’ way.
‘Finding out a state without prior knowledge is a necessary condition for a state
to objectively exist’ (p.423). This is only possible for states that ‘survive de-
coherence’ – of which multiple copies can be extracted and distributed in the
environment. Survival in this sense is ‘quantum Darwinism’. Meanwhile deco-
herence theory is not a good starting point for understanding the origins of the
classical, for (in line with his complaint already mentioned) it already involves
probability. Zurek substitutes ideas from information theory instead. They,
and the requirement that ‘evolutions are unitary’, are his core principles. From
them he attempts to derive those aspects of the measurement postulates that
do not involve collapse.
That seems to suggest the Schro¨dinger equation has unrestricted validity.
But is it true in Zurek’s view that the universe as a whole can be assigned a
wave-function? He says on the one hand that to whatever extent there remains
a measurement problem in his framework it is solved by Everett’s relative state
formalism: that explains ‘apparent collapse’. He notes that “even if ‘everything
happens’, a specific observer would remember a specific sequence of past events
that happened to him”. But on the other hand:
The concept of probability does not (need not!) concern alterna-
tives that already exist (as in classical discussions of probability, or
some ‘Many Worlds’ discussions). Rather, it concerns future poten-
tial events one of which will become a reality upon a measurement.
(p.425)
In Chapter 14 Jeff Bub and Itamar Pitowsky offer a more overtly information-
theoretic account of reality. In it Everett’s ideas play no role. Quantum state
realism is rejected altogether, rather than circumscribed as in Zurek’s approach.
So what does exist in their picture?
Measurements, to begin with. The key idea is not only to reject the view that
the quantum state is something real; it is to reject the idea that measurement
cannot figure as a primitive. They are both of them ‘dogmas’. The dogma
about measurement (what they call ‘Bell’s assertion’, citing Bell [1990]) is:
[M]easurement should never be introduced as a primitive process in a
fundamental mechanical theory like classical or quantum mechanics,
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but should always be open to a complete analysis, in principle, of
how the individual outcomes come about dynamically. (p.436)
Dispense with this and quantum-state realism and the measurement problem is
exposed as a pseudo-problem.
To be more specific: the measurement problem breaks down into two parts,
the ‘big measurement problem’, namely, ‘the problem of explaining how individ-
ual measurement outcomes come about dynamically’, and the ‘small measure-
ment problem’, which is ‘the problem of accounting for our familiar experience
of a classical or Boolean macroworld, given the non-Boolean character of the un-
derlying quantum event space’ (p.436). The latter they are happy to phrase as
‘the problem of explaining the dynamical emergence of an effectively classical
probability space of macroscopic measurement outcomes in a quantum mea-
surement process’. Decoherence theory is the answer to the small measurement
problem; but the big measurement problem should be recognized for what it is,
a pseudo-problem.
Why precisely does the big problem go away if measurements are primitive
and the quantum state is a matter of degrees of belief and nothing else? Because
‘probability’ is a primitive too: ‘probabilities (objective chances) are “uniquely
given from the start” by the geometry of Hilbert space.’ (p.432). This, and
inherent information-loss, an ‘irreducible and uncontrollable disturbance’, follow
from a deeper principle, the ‘no-broadcasting’ principle.
Bub and Pitowsky ask us to rethink the ways realism works in the physical
sciences. They make a detailed parallel with the special theory of relativity:
no-broadcasting (and no-cloning) and no-signalling are analogues of Einstein’s
relativity and light-speed principles. Minkowski spacetime is the associated
‘constructive’ theory – its geometry explains Einstein’s phenomenological prin-
ciples. Analogously, the geometry of Hilbert space explains Bub and Pitowsky’s
information-theoretic principles. Just as Minkowski spacetime suffices, they say,
to explain length contraction and time dilation, independent of any dynamical
principles, Hilbert space suffices to explain the structure of quantum mechanical
probabilities, independent of any dynamical analysis. In either case (in special
relativity or in quantum mechanics) a dynamical analysis can be provided – but
as a consistency proof, not as an explanation. In special relativity this involves
the explicit construction of a dynamical model (it doesn’t matter which, so
long as it respects the spacetime symmetries). In quantum mechanics it is the
‘small’ measurement problem, answered by providing a construction in decoher-
ence theory (it doesn’t matter which, so long as it models the ‘same’ experiment)
of an effectively classical probability space of macroscopic outcomes. It is be-
cause the latter is provided that their theory, in their estimation, qualifies as
realist.
But is that sufficient? Omitted, according to Chris Timpson in his commen-
tary on Bub and Pitowsky, is provision of a dynamical account of how one among
these macroscopic outcomes is realized – precisely a solution to the big measure-
ment problem. According to Timpson, ‘forgo this and they forgo their realism’.
In every other one-world realist interpretation — or revision – of quantum me-
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chanics, there is an account of how one rather than another individual outcome
comes about dynamically. The argument from no-broadcasting or no-cloning
may show that measurement involves an irreducible, uncontrollable, informa-
tion loss, but that doesn’t make it indescribable; there is nothing in the parallel
with special relativity to support that contention. Bub and Pitowsky are enti-
tled if they wish to reject the view that the measurement process – specifically,
a process by which individual outcomes are obtained – be dynamically ana-
lyzed, says Timpson, but the charge that it is a dogma is unargued. The claim
that it can be eliminated, compatible with realism, is unsubstantiated. On the
contrary, he insists, it is rather directly implied by realism.
The general advantages of an anti-realist view of the quantum state are
pressed by Ru¨diger Schack in Chapter 15. His perspective, like that of Bub and
Pitowsky, is that of quantum information theory. In the context of Bayesian
updating of beliefs on repeated measurements, Everettians have to assume the
same quantum state is prepared on each trial. This, says Schack, is a problem
(the ‘problem of repeated trials’) that simply disappears if the quantum state
is purely epistemic. Assumptions about the apparatus are still required, true,
but they are part of an agent’s priors, to be updated in the light of evidence.
‘This raises the question of whether the concept of an objective quantum state
has any useful role to play at all’ (p.471), a question he answers in the negative.
At least in the pilot-wave theory we have a clear-cut one-world form of realism.
Or do we? In Chapter 16 Antony Valentini responds to the argument that
realism about the pilot-wave implies many worlds.
His argument is in effect to grant that whatever the situation in equilib-
rium pilot-wave theory, in which the probability distribution of the Bohmian
trajectories is as given by the Born rule, the charge does not apply to the
non-equilibrium theory. And (his argument continues) there is every reason, if
pilot-wave theory is true, to expect non-equilibrium behaviour, just as in clas-
sical statistical mechanics – it would be a conspiracy theory if the full range
of dynamical behaviour in principle permitted by the theory were to be forever
and in principle concealed.
But then, given a reliable source of non-equilibrium matter, one can perform
‘subquantum’ measurements, measurements that can be used to probe occupied
and empty waves and can tell the difference between them. They will not behave
as on a par. Pilot-wave theory considered in this way must in principle differ
from Everettian quantum theory. Thus Valentini concludes:
At best, it can only be argued that, if approximately classical experi-
menters are confined to the quantum equilibrium state, so that they
are unable to perform subquantum measurements, then they will
encounter a phenomenological appearance of many worlds – just as
they will encounter a phenomenological appearance of locality, un-
certainty, and of quantum physics generally. (Valentini p.498-99)
In the presence of non-equilibrium phenomena such observers will quickly dis-
cover the explanatory and predictive failings of these appearances. Therefore
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there is no reason to reify them – they are ‘merely mathematical’. The ‘basic
constituents’ of ordinary matter are the Bohmian particles, not wave-packets,
or parts of the wave-function indexed by the particles.
The reality of the pilot wave as a whole, however, is not in doubt. As Bell
said, in a remark quoted by Valentini approvingly, ‘no one can understand this
theory until he is willing to think of ψ as a real objective field....even though it
propagates not in 3−space but in 3N−space’ (Bell [1987 p.128]). For Valentini,
the bottom line is its contingency: ψ simply contains too much contingent
structure to be thought of an elliptical way of stating a physical law.
But aren’t worlds – patterns in the wave function – contingent structures
too? And don’t supposedly intrinsic properties of Bohmian particles like charge
or mass (both gravitational and inertial mass) act, in experimental contexts,
as if associated with the pilot-wave rather than the particles? So asks Harvey
Brown in his reply to Valentini. Most tellingly in his eyes:
[T]he reality of these patterns is not like locality and uncertainty,
which are ultimately statistical notions and are supposed to depend
on whether equilibrium holds. The patterns, on the other hand, are
features of the wavefunction and are either there or they are not,
regardless of the equilibrium condition. (p.512).
It seems we are at a stand-off: patterns in the wave-function are epiphe-
nomenal in a non-equilibrium theory of Bohmian trajectories, and Bohmian
trajectories are epiphenomena in the Everettian theory of quantum mechanics.
But not really: on this point experiment will decide. As Brown freely admits,
if as Valentini hopes we were eventually to observe exotic statistics of the sort
he predicts, ‘Everettians would have to throw in the towel’. But he doubts that
pilot-wave theory really offers grounds for that hope, even taken on its own
terms.
Not only many worlds
The final chapters in Part 6 of the book are by contrast friendly to Everett, but
they break new ground. In Chapter 17 Peter Byrne tells the story of how Ev-
erett’s ideas were initially received, and how they were encouraged and ignored
– and, in certain respects, suppressed. In the ’50s and ’60s, the dead weight of
Bohr’s authority was clearly in evidence. But in David Deutsch’s estimation,
the level of debate scarcely improved in the two decades following. The reason?
Because the worth of the theory should have been demonstrated at the gen-
uinely quantum mechanical (‘multiversial’) level, apart from universes. Worlds,
universes, are essentially the classical structures in quantum mechanics. Too
much of the debate, according to Deutsch in Chapter 18, concerned realism in
general, distorting scientific judgments in foundations. How odd, he asks, is
this:
Schro¨dinger had the basic idea of multiple universes shortly before
Everett, but he didn’t publish anything. He mentioned it in a lec-
ture in Dublin (Schro¨dinger [1996]), in which he predicted that his
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audience would think he was crazy. Isn’t that a strange assertion
coming from a Nobel Prize winner – that he feared being considered
crazy for claiming that his own equation, the one that he won the
prize for, might be true. (p.542).
And how odd would it seem, Deutsch continues, if Everettian quantum theory
were to be widely accepted, to talk of it as the ‘interpretation’ of quantum
mechanics. It would be like talking of dinosaurs as the ‘interpretation’ of fossil
records, rather than the things in the theory that explains them.
But Deutsch’s main complaint is the same as Maudlin’s: there has been too
little progress with the really foundational questions about ontology in quantum
mechanics. He goes further in demanding progress in a range of areas – prob-
ability in cosmology, quantum computers, relativistically covariant information
flows – on the basis of an unfettered quantum mechanical realism. Progress
on these fronts, he says, is what will settle the matter. Deutsch asks much of
Everettians.
He has some takers. The links with cosmology are explored in more detail
by Max Tegmark in Chapter 19. He compares and contrasts Everettian worlds
with multiple universes as they arise in inflationary cosmology – or multiplic-
ities, even, in a sufficiently large single universe – more or less independent of
quantum mechanics. How do they differ? His list includes the evidential problem
(under three headings), several aspects of the debates over probability, reasons
for which other worlds are unseen, and more. The answer, he concludes, is sur-
prisingly modest: Hilbert-space structure replaces spatiotemporal structure in
explaining the invisibility of other words, and enters directly in the definition of
probability, but in all other respects the issues are essentially unchanged. One
thing he does not mention, however, is the question of whether uncertainty in
a branching Everettian universe really is like uncertainty in the cosmological
multiverse. He is (rightly, if the arguments of Chapter 6 are correct) insensitive
to the distinction between diverging and overlapping worlds. But on this point
Deutsch, who is clearly well-disposed to the idea of overlap (and well-disposed
to the analogous manoeuvre in the case of classically diverging worlds of taking
observers as sets of worlds), may be disappointed.
Lev Vaidman in Chapter 20 takes up Deutsch’s challenge more directly: what
else is there in quantum mechanics apart from the universes? Vaidman considers
a very specific suggestion. It is possible, in ordinary quantum mechanics, to
introduce a backwards-evolving wave-function coming from the future outcome
of an experiment, as proposed by Y. Aharonov and his collaborators. The so-
called ‘two-vector’ formalism has been put to practical use in the theory of
‘weak’ measurements (see Aharonov and Vaidman [2007] for a recent review):
it should be available to Everettians too.
Or so Vaidman concludes. Of course in the global perspective of the Everett
interpretation there is no one outcome – a backwards-evolving state must be
introduced for every branching event – but in the case of measurement events,
they have just the same uses that Aharonov advertised. All save one, per-
haps the most important: it does not, according to Vaidman, define a time-
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symmetric theory. That is a disappointment. On the other hand, he speculates,
the backwards-evolving vectors may perhaps also serve to underpin the notion
of uncertainty. At the very least. it is a tool for the definition of a quantum
event as part of a unique history.
Other items on Deutsch’s list get little or no further mention. For better or
worse, in this book we are still labouring over the question of ‘interpretation’
– if not, at least for the most part, the virtues of realism. Were familiarity,
common-sense, and intuition among them, no doubt the Everett interpretation
would be rejected out of hand; but those were never the hallmarks of truth.
3 Addendum: from relative states to consistent
histories
3.1 The measurement postulates
Measurements on a system S are formally characterized in terms of a self-adjoint
operator O (an observable) on a Hilbert space H associated with S, and a state
|ψ〉 (a unit vector in H up to phase). In practise there may be some uncertainty
as to what the state actually prepared in an experiment is (in which case |ψ〉 is
replaced by a density matrix), but we shall consider only the simplest case.
An observable in quantum mechanics is in turn associated with a range of
real numbers (roughly, its possible values, or eigenvalues), the spectrum Sp(O)
of O. A measurement outcome is a subset E ⊆ Sp(O), with associated projector
PE on H. The most important of the measurement postulates is the rule: the
outcome E will be observed on measurement of O when S is in the state |ψ〉
with probability Pr(E) given by:
Born rule Pr(E) = 〈φ|PE |φ〉 = ‖PE |φ〉‖2 .
If, further, the experiment is non-disturbing – on immediate repetition the same
outcome E is reliably obtained – then the state must have been subject to the
transition
projection postulate |φ〉 → |φE〉 = PE |φ〉|PE |φ〉| .
When E is an eigenvalue of O, the RHS is one of its eigenstates.
Thus for a non-disturbing measurement of O the overall evolution in the
Schro¨dinger picture, in which the state (rather than operators) carry the time-
dependence, is of the form:
|φ〉 unitary→ |φ′〉 collapse→ PE |φ
′〉
|PE |φ′〉| .
In the case of disturbing measurements, if the measurement is probabilistic, that
collapse still occurs (albeit the final state may be unknown) cannot be doubted.
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We may take it as a phenomenological given, independent, even, of quantum
state realism.
The final stage of the measurement cannot therefore be modelled unitarily –
unless, it may be, if the measurement is not probabilistic. Suppose it is indeed
fully predictable. Then there is no obstacle, at least for certain kinds of states,
for (say) reasonably massive and well-localized clusters of atoms in bound states,
well-localized in position and momentum space, to giving a unitary description
of their motions. The spread of the wave-packet, for such massive systems, is
negligible over the timescale of the experiment. Ehrenfest’s theorem then takes
on a strong form, showing that wave-packets like these approximately follow
classical trajectories (see Hartle, Chapter 2). In terms of operators, approximate
projections onto states like these form a commutative set of projectors, as shown
by von Neumann [1932 p.402-409]. They are what he called the ‘elementary
building blocks of the classical description of the world’ (p.409). Whether in
terms of wave-packets or projections of this form the unitary equations imply
approximately classical trajectories, for timescales much larger than those of
the experiment, if the masses are sufficiently large.
To take the example of a Stern-Gerlach experiment for a deterministic mea-
surement of electron spin with eigenstates |φ↑〉, |φ↓〉, the registration of the
electron at the screen and subsequent amplification processes involve many-
particle systems of the sort just described. If we start off with localized states
for the ‘ready’ state of the apparatus A in state |ψAready〉, with |ψAreads spin ↑〉 for
the event registering ‘reads spin up’, the unitary evolution is:
|φ↑〉 ⊗ |ψAready〉 unitary→ |φabsorbed〉 ⊗ |ψAreads spin ↑〉.
But then there is nothing, assuming the arbitrariness of the von Neumann cut,
to including ever more aspects of the laboratory, including experimentalists and
technicians. That is, as built out of the same von Neumann’s projectors, one
can model ‘the observer’ O well. Thus if initially in the state |ξOready〉, one has
by the unitary formalism:
|φ↑〉 ⊗ |ψAready〉 ⊗ |ξOready〉
unitary→ |φabsorbed〉 ⊗ |ψAreads spin ↑〉 ⊗ |ξOready〉
unitary→ |φabsorbed〉 ⊗ |ψAreads spin ↑〉 ⊗ |ξOsees spin ↑ 〉.
If the apparatus functions properly, and reliably detects a particle in the down
state of spin ↓, a similar schema will apply to that case, when the initial state
of the electron is |φ↓〉. The unitary equations, for sufficiently massive systems
in states well-localized in phase space, appear perfectly adequate to describe
such processes – highly schematic, true, but easily refined – so long as they are
deterministic.
Of course the trouble with all of this if quantum mechanics is to describe the
macroworld is that experiments often aren’t deterministic, and correspondingly,
however well-localized the initial states of aggregates of atoms in the apparatus,
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the apparatus and the observer don’t end up in states well-localized in phase
space. For let the initial state be of the form
|φ〉 = a|φ↑〉+ b|φ↓〉.
where a and b are constants. Then by the linearity of the unitary dynamics the
superposition of the two final states results:
a|φabsorbed〉 ⊗ |ψAreads spin ↑〉 ⊗ |ξOreads spin ↑ 〉+
b|φabsorbed〉 ⊗ |ψAreads spin ↓〉 ⊗ |ξOsees spin ↓ 〉
and this deterministic motion doesn’t seem to correspond to anything. Hence
the need for the collapse postulate (with the Ek’s standing for ‘spin ↑’ and ‘spin
↓’).
But note how the measurement problem, on this line of reasoning, as inti-
mated by von Neumann [1932 Ch.6], and as used by Schro¨dinger [1935] (in terms
of the ‘cat’ paradox) and by Wigner [1961] (in terms of the ’friend’ paradox)
is changed: it is that if you allow the von Neumann chain to extend well into
the macroscopic, using von Neumann’s building blocks, then you find the uni-
tary equations yield a superposition of states each one of which tells a perfectly
reasonable physical story.
3.2 Everett’s relative states
With this background in place21 Everett’s contribution, as it appeared in Everett
[1957], may seem rather modest: it was to show that on repeated quantum
measurements (using only the unitary formalism) of the von Neumann kind one
obtains a superposition of states, each of which tells a physically reasonable
statistical story – just as if each sequence of states were arrived at by repeated
application of the projection postulate after each trial.
Modest or not, the idea required some new notation. Everett gave a model
of a quantum automaton A which combined the functions of the apparatus and
the observer, but indexed, not by a single outcome, but by a string of outcomes.
Its ‘ready’ state is |ψA[......]〉. The measurement interaction is as before the von
Neumann model. The automaton on interacting with the system S in any of an
orthogonal set of states {|φi〉} evolves unitarily (in the Schro¨dinger picture) as:
|φi〉 ⊗ |ψA[......]〉 unitary→ |φi〉 ⊗ |ψA[......αi ]〉 (1)
21Everettt had much of it: ‘any general state can at any instant be analyzed into a superpo-
sition of states each of which does represent the bodies with fairly well defined positions and
momenta. Each of these states then propagates approximately according to classical laws, so
that the general state can be viewed as a superposition of quasi-classical states propagating
according to nearly classical trajectories.’ (Everett [1973 p.89]). In a footnote, Everett sum-
marized von Neumann’s construction as just discussed (but with no mention of the strong
form of Ehrenfest’s theorem).
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in which αi characterizes the state |φi〉 (say, the eigenvalue of an operator in
the eigenstate |φi〉). If the microscopic system is in the state |ψ〉 =
∑
i ci|φi〉, it
follows:
|φ〉 ⊗ |ψA[......]〉 →
∑
i
ci|φi〉 ⊗ |ψA[......αi ]〉. (2)
Suppose that the system in the final state, given by the RHS of (3), is subject
to the same interaction again: then there results:
|φ〉 ⊗ |ψA[......]〉 →
∑
i
ci|φi〉 ⊗ |ψA[......αi ]〉 →
∑
i
ci|φi〉 ⊗ |ψA[......αiαi ]〉.
That is to say: the recorded value, on the second measurement, is precisely the
same as the first, for each component of the final, total, superposition – just as
if the projection postulate had been invoked at the end of the first process Eq.(3).
It further follows, if there are n systems n the similarly prepared state |φ〉,
each of which is independently measured, with the results recorded by A, that:
|φ〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |ψA[......]〉 →∑
i,j,...,k
cicj ...ck|φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉 ⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |φ〉 ⊗ |ψA[αk.....αjαi ]〉
whereupon a (different) sequence of results is recorded by the automaton in each
state entering into the final superposition – that is, in each component, there is
a record of a definite sequence of outcomes, a definite statistics.
What about the outcomes themselves, apart from the records? Everett’s
answer was that they have values in a ‘relative’ sense – that for each state
|ψA[αk...αjαi ]〉 in the superposition there exists its relative state |φi〉 ⊗ |φj〉 ⊗
... ⊗ |φk〉 of the n−subsystems. There is no ‘true’ state of a subsystem – only
a state of a subsystem, relative to a state of another subsystem. This is the
essential novelty of quantum mechanics, in Everett’s view – in fact, it already
followed from the basic structure of entanglement. He summarized the matter
thus quite early in his paper:
There does not, in general, exist anything like a single state for one
subsystem of a composite system. Subsystems do not possess states
that are independent of the states of the remainder of the system, so
that the subsystem states are generally correlated with one another.
One can arbitrarily choose a state for one subsystem, and be led
to the relative state for the remainder. thus we are faced with a
fundamental relativity of states, which his implied by the formalism
of composite systems. It is meaningless to ask the absolute state of
a subsystem – one can only ask the state relative to a given state
of the remainder of the subsystem. (Everett [1957 p.143], emphasis
original.)
That seems to invite a broadly structuralist reading of the wave function.
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Only much later in the paper did Everett revisit the question of how, pre-
cisely, these relational structures can all coexist. But at this point, following on
his analysis in terms of automata, he immediately brought the question back
to the invisibility of branching – that is, to the question of what is observable.
But he did make a pregnant comparison:
Arguments that the world picture presented by this theory is con-
tradicted by experience, because we are unaware of any branching
process, are like the criticism of the Copernical theory that the mo-
bility of the earth as a real physical fact is incompatible with the
common sense interpretation of nature because we feel no such mo-
tion. In both cases the arguments fails when it is shown that our
experience will be what it in fact is. (In the Copernican case the ad-
dition of Newtonian physics was required to be able to show that the
earth’s inhabitants would be unaware of any motion of the earth.)
(Everett [1957] note added in proof).
It was Galileo, of course, who supplied arguments as to why the motion
of the earth would be unobservable, if the Copernican theory were true. But
Everett might have elaborated the analogy. Equally, one might say that in a
classical space-time theory, only relative positions, relative velocities, are real;
it is just as meaningless to ask for the absolute state of motion of a system as to
ask for its absolute quantum state. But that suggests a rather different question
than the one suggested, as a parallel, by Everett. Not, ‘why is the motion of the
earth invisible?’, but ‘what is motion?’, and the comparison, not with Galileo,
but with Descartes.
Descartes gave a purely relational account of motion just as did Everett of
value-definiteness. It amounted to motion as rate of change of relative distances,
and nothing else. As such it failed to explain the appearances – at best it
only described them. Further dynamical principles were needed to pick out the
privileged (relative) motions, the inertial motions.
It was the same with Everett’s concept of relative states. He advocated the
use of von Neumann’s ‘elementary building blocks’, but equally he appealed to
the Schmidt decomposition (see below), what he called the ‘canonical represen-
tation’ ([1973 p.47]). At times he wrote as if the superposition principle all by
itself guaranteed the dynamical autonomy of components of the universal state
([1973 p.98]). What was missing were dynamical considerations to show that
this was so – to pick out the significant motions.
Something more than the schematic and idealized dynamics of the von Neu-
mann model or the kinematic Schmidt decomposition of the state was needed.
3.3 Quantum histories
Equations of this kind were eventually obtained for a variety of many-particle
systems – this the burgeoning field of decoherence theory. But dynamics can
also be thought of in more structural terms, in terms of the possible histories
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of a physical system. That fits better with the philosophers’ way of thinking of
things.
Histories proper, retrodictions in quantum mechanics, were early on recog-
nized as quite different from predicted courses of events. They could be fitted,
sort of, into Bohr’s interpretative framework, as shown by G. Hermann ([1935]),
in a study that Heisenberg had encouraged. But the subject languished. But
dynamics as structures of histories arose in fields as diverse as optics and gen-
eral relativity. Much of the impetus to develop Everett’s ideas lay in hoped-for
applications in quantum cosmology. The quantum histories formalism, as de-
veloped by R. Griffiths, R. Omne`s, M. Gell-Mann and J. B. Hartle in the late
1980s, had a variety of sources.
It does Everett nicely. Let {Pα}, α = 1, 2, ... be an exhaustive, commuting
set of projection operators on a Hilbert space H, i.e.:
αPα = I, PαPβ = δαβPα.
They may be taken to be von Neumann’s ‘elementary building blocks of the
classical world’ (in fact, if we do this we obtain a quasiclassical domain, in Gell-
Mann and Hartle’s sense). Let H be the Hamiltonian – again, with no explicit
time-dependency. Define the Heisenberg picture operators:
Pα(t) = e
iHt/~Pαe
−iHt/~.
For the simplest example of a set of histories, consider histories constructed out
of sequences of projectors in {Pα1(t1)}, {Pα2(t2)}, ..., {Pαn(tn)}22, for a sequence
of times t1 < t2 < ... < tn (the choice of sequence, like the choice of cells on
configuration space, is for the time being arbitrary). An individual history α is
now a particular sequence (α1, α2, ..., αn) and is represented by a chain (or in
Hartle’s language a class) operator:
Cα = Pαn(tn)Pαn−1(tn−1)...Pα1(t1).
Such operators Cα are self-adjoint and positive, but they are not projectors.
Acting on the state |Ψ〉 at t = 0 we obtain the branch state vector Cα|Ψ〉. It
is the same as the vector (time-evolved back to t = 0) that would have been
obtained in the Schro¨dinger picture by a sequence of non-disturbing measure-
ments (using the measurement postulates), first of the projection P 1α1at time t1
(collapsing onto the vector Ψα1(t1) = Pα1e
−iHt1/~|Ψ(0)〉), then of the projection
Pα2at time t2 (collapsing onto the vector Ψα2α1(t2) = Pα2e
−iH(t2−t1)/~Pα1e
−iHt1/~|Ψ(t1〉),
and so on, with modulus square equal to the product of the probabilities for
each collapse (as calculated using the measurement postulates). That is, the
probability p(α) for a history α is the modulus square of the branch state vector
Cα|Ψ〉
p(α) = ‖|Cα|Ψ〉‖2 = Tr(CαρC†α) (3)
22Jim Hartle in Ch.2 considers more general histories, in which different families of projectors
are chosen at different times (with corresponding superscripts on the Pαk (tk)’s).
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where ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| is the density matrix for the state |Ψ〉 and ‘Tr’ is the trace
(Tr(O) =k 〈φk|Oφk〉, for any operator O and orthonormal basis {φk} over H).
Likewise, one can define the conditional probability of α (for tn < ... < tk+1)
given β (for tk < ... < t1) as
pρ(α/β) =
Tr(Cα∗βρC
†
α∗β)
Tr(CβρC
†
β)
. (4)
where α ∗β is the history comprising β (up to time tk) and α (from tk+1 to tn).
But this interpretation of the quantities p(α), p(α/β) as probabilities in
the context of the Everett interpretation needs justification. In general, for
arbitrary choices of families of projectors {Pαk}, they have nothing to do with
probabilities. The use of the trace in Eq.(3) and (4) is no more than a formal
device for extracting squared norms of amplitudes and transition amplitudes;
they are relations in the Hilbert space norm, defined – deterministically defined,
note, under the unitary equations – to facilitate the structural analysis of the
state. At this stage they mean nothing more.
But we may help ourselves to their obvious structural meaning, when these
transition amplitudes are zero or one. We thus talk of anticorrelations and
correlations among the associated sequences of projectors, and by extension,
the configurations α and β on which they project. In the single-stage case,
suppose the latter pertain to different systems, represented by projectors of the
form Pα ⊗ I, I ⊗ Pβ . Let pρ(α/β) = 1 and let ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. In the special case
where Pα and Pβ are 1−dimensional with ranges |α〉, |β〉, then |α〉 is the relative
state of |β〉 in the state |Ψ〉, in Everett’s sense. More generally: if pρ(α/β) = 1
then α is the ‘relative configuration’ of β in |Ψ〉.
Here is a connection with the Schmidt decomposition. It is a theorem that
for any vector Ψ in the tensor product Hilbert space HA+B = HA ⊗HB of two
systems A and B, there exists orthonormal basis {φk} in HA, and {ψk} in HB,
and complex numbers ck such that
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
ck|φk〉 ⊗ |ψk〉. (5)
If for k 6= j |ck| 6= |cj |, then the bases {φk} in HA and {ψk} in HB are unique.
Eq.(5) is the Schmidt decomposition. If these bases diagonalize Pα and Pβ
respectively, then (for any dimensionality)∑
k; Pα|φk〉=|φk〉
ck|ψk〉
is the relative state of Pα
∑
k ck|φk〉 in the state |Ψ〉. Given this condition,
relativization in Everett’s sense is a symmetric relation.
3.4 Coarse-graining and consistency
The notion of coarse-graining of a parameter space (like configuration space)
extends naturally to chain operators, thus. Let {α} be a coarse graining of
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{α}, so that each finer-grained cell α is contained in some coarser grained cell
α in the parameter space. We can then speak of coarser- and finer-grainings
of histories too. Now consider a set of histories with chain operators {Cα},
and a coarse-graining with chain operators {Cα}. Then the two are related by
summation:
Cα =
∑
α∈α
Cα
where the sum is over all finer-grained histories α contained within α.
Now for a candidate fundamental ontology (Saunders [1994], [1995]): it is the
system of correlations and transition amplitudes among values of self-adjoint
dynamical variables and their coarse-grainings – in quantum mechanics, among
values of particle variables; in quantum field theory, among values, local in
space and time, of field densities. The latter mirrors, roughly, the fundamental
ontology in classical general relativity theories, in terms of invariant relations
among values of metric and matter fields.
As in general relativity, some order can be introduced by a formal condition.
Given a Lorentzian geometry it is useful to introduce a foliation to a manifold
– a collection of global 3−dimensional surfaces whose tangent vectors are ev-
erywhere spacelike. It is useful, considering the structure of a quantum state,
to consider families of projectors for which branch state vectors, for histories
neither of which is a coarse-graining of the other, are approximately orthogonal:
〈CαΨ|Cα′Ψ〉 ≈ 0 , α /∈ α′ and α′ /∈ α. (6)
Such histories are called consistent (by Griffiths and Omne`s); (medium) deco-
herent (by Hartle and Halliwell). Given consistency, Everett’s relativization is
a transitive relation even in time-like directions (Saunders [1995b]; it is auto-
matically transitive in space-like directions by virtue of microcausality).
The coarse-graining of histories exploits Hilbert-space structures, notably,
the Boolean algebra of the projectors used to generate those histories. If this is
used to turn a history space into a probability space (a Borel space), equipped
with a σ−algebra, then the measure must be additive with respect to coarse-
graining:
p(α) =
∑
α∈α
p(α). (7)
The analogous condition for the Schro¨dinger picture state (essentially, single-
time histories) is automatically satisfied, given Eq.(3) (Everett turned this rea-
soning around: assuming additivity, he derived (3)); it is satisfied by two-time
histories as well. But in the general case it fails. The consistency condition as
originally defined is the necessary and sufficient condition for additivity in the
sense of (7); the condition as specified, Eq.(6), is slightly stronger but somewhat
simpler – this is the condition that is widely used.
It follows too that for any consistent history space there exists a fine-graining
{Pα} which is consistent and for which, for any tn > tm and for any αn with
Pαn(tn)|Ψ〉 6= 0, there exists exactly one αm such that
Pαn(tn)Pαm(tm)|Ψ〉 6= 0
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(Griffiths [1993], Wallace [2010]). That is, for each αn at time tn, there is a
unique history preceding it – the set of histories can be fine-grained so as to
have a purely branching structure (with no recombination of branches). The
connection, at this point, with the Aharonov 2−vector formalism is immediate
(see Vaidman’s Chapter 20).
The consistency condition and the quantum histories formalism is widely
advertised as providing a generalization of quantum theory as, fundamentally, a
theory of probability. As such there is a continuum infinity of consistent history
spaces available – new resources, for the exploration of quantum systems, in-
deed. But from the point of view of Everettian quantum mechanics consistency
is far too weak a condition to give substance to the notion of histories as au-
tonomous and robust dynamical structures, and probability, as associated with
branching of such structures, is too high-level a concept to figure in the founda-
tions of quantum mechanics. At any rate, consistency holds automatically given
decoherence in the sense of quasiclassicality (or realms more generally), itself
only an approximate condition, but still our abiding criterion for the existence
of worlds.
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